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Appeals

February 12, 2009

Hines v. Carpenter, Ky COA, Damages From Supersedeas Bond Pending Appeal Of Child Support

Hines v. Carpenter, _ S.W.3d _ (Ky. App. 2009), 2006-CA-002173-MR

The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Hines for back child support owed by Carpenter.  Carpenter appealed the judgment and posted a supersedeas bond to stay the collection of the judgment while the appeal was pending.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Hines.  Then a QDRO was entered by the trial court, requiring that Hines be paid 50% of Carpenter’s monthly benefit until the sum of $149,495.01 was paid in full, or the Appellants die, or Carpenter dies, whichever first occurs. Hines then filed a motion to compel Carpenter to pay a lump sum of $14,175 for damages allegedly incurred by the posting of the supersedeas bond.  The trial court denied the motion to compel.  This appeal followed.  
   The sum of $14,175 is equivalent to the 21 monthly payments that Hines would have received during the pendency of the appeal.  Hines argued the motion to compel should have been granted because interest on the uncollected judgment was accruing at more than twice the rate of the current monthly payments by the pension plan.  She also argued that the full judgment would never be recouped since Carpenter, who was sixty-two years old at the time the motion to compel was filed, would have to live another 18 years for them to receive just the principal amount of the judgment.  
KRS 26A.300(1) prohibits the collection of damages on a first appeal as a matter of right.  Carpenter’s appeal was his first on this issue.  Therefore, the relief Hines requested was statutorily forbidden.  
AFFIRMED

Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

February 09, 2009

One To Be Published Ky COA Family Law Decision Released 2/6/09; None Released 1/30/09 Due To Weather

A digest of Hines v. Carpenter will be posted shortly. It affirms the denial of motion to compel lump sum payment for damages where father posted supersedeas bond on judgment for back child support.

December 18, 2007

Johnson v. Johnson (KY) No 15% Change In Child Support Not Preserved For Appeal

Johnson v. Johnson, 232 S.W.3d 571 (Ky. App. 2007)

Dad appealed an order recalculating and increasing his child support. On appeal, Dad argued that it was error for the TC to review child support because Mom did not show a 15% change in the amount of child support due. Also, Dad argued that the TC abused its discretion in raising his child support because mom didn’t show a 15% increase. CA held the TC erred in not making any findings of fact but Dad failed to request the court make such findings and therefore failed to preserve the error for appeal.
Digested by Linda Dixon Bullock, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

January 24, 2007

Appeals: Bifurcated Issues

The Family Law Prof Blog posts Case Law Development: Bifurcating Judgment Precludes Appeal:

A recent inquiry from a reader asked whether bifurcated judgments in divorce actions may be separately appealed. Here is at least one court's answer...
Rather than simply enter temporary orders, a divorce court will sometimes bifurcate a divorce judgment, granting divorce or child custody for example, and reserving judgment of financial issues pending more factual development or hearings. However, the Illinois court has held that such a bifurcated judgment is not final for purposes of appeal. In this case, the trial judge entered a judgment of dissolution, divided the marital property, granted sole custody of the children to petitioner, set child support of $1,306.95 a month, and barred respondent from receiving maintenance. However, it "reserved" the issues of visitation, the children's post-high-school educational expenses, and petitioner's maintenance. Raising the issue sua sponte, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that "The reservation of issues here deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal." -- No bifurcating appeals.
Mardjetko v. Mardjetko, 2007 Ill. App. Lexis 3 (January 5, 2007)
Opinion on the web (last visited January 15, 2007 bgf)


I had asked Professor Barbara Glesner Fines, Ruby M. Hulen Professor of Law, University of Missouri Kansas City to keep a "heads up" for cases that may give insight on whether issues may be bifurcated on a motion for discretionary review, so that some issues could be remanded to the trial court for a new trial while others go up on issues of law to a state's highest court. I very much appreciate her keeping this on her radar.

December 11, 2006

The Child Custody Issue Needs To Be Remanded For A New Trial But it Would Be A Great Case For Discretionary Review On The Goodwill Issue: What Will Retired Justice James E. Keller Do?

Gaskill v. Robbins, NO. 2005-CA-002088-MR, http://opinions.kycourts.net/coa/2005-ca-002088.pdf, was decided December 8, 2006 in an Opinion Reversing and Remanding which is designated to be published. The custody determination and business value determined by Warren Family Court Judge Margaret Ryan Huddleston were reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The trial court rejected any valuation which excluded any goodwill stating that “there is no reported legal authority for the distinction in goodwill” (personal v. enterprise). “To the contrary, it is generally accepted in Kentucky that the goodwill of a closely held corporation should be assigned value in a dissolution proceeding,” citing to Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.App. 1991), Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.App. 1990), and Heller v. Heller , 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky.App. 1984), in support of this proposition.”
The Court of Appeals noted “While we acknowledged that ‘the goodwill contained in a business should be considered when arriving at the value of a practice,’ Id. at 55, citing Heller, 672 S.W.2d at 947 (Emphasis added), we rejected the argument that Heller held that all businesses have goodwill. Id. Consequently, we upheld the trial court’s decision to not include an amount for goodwill in valuing the appellee’s medical practice, concluding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, Id. at 56.”… The question therefore arises as to whether the court gave appropriate consideration to the issue and properly exercised the discretion afforded to it in matters of valuation. See Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 60, citing Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.App. 1987). We believe that it did not. As the court was laboring under the misconception that providing a value for goodwill was compulsory in reaching its decision, we believe that it cannot be said that the court exercised its discretion appropriately.”
Here is the meat of the decision on this issue:
“After considering the issue and the facts of this case, we are not inclined to deviate from long-standing precedent by creating a wholesale change of law holding that “personal” and “enterprise” goodwill should be distinguished for purposes of property evaluation in a divorce proceeding – even given that Gaskill’s practice is a sole proprietorship. Issues of stare decisis aside, we believe that “[i]t would be inequitable to hold that the form of the business enterprise can defeat the community’s interest in the professional goodwill. Such a result ignores the contribution made by the nonprofessional spouse to the success of the profession ….” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. 1987).”
The problem in the facts before the Court of Appeals in this case was that the non-professional spouse was actively involved in the business. So, while the contributions of the non-professional spouse may be quite relevant to the facts of this case, they usually are not. I agree with Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley, sitting as Special Judge, who stated in his Concurring Opinion “I believe she makes a compelling case that ‘personal’ goodwill should not be considered marital property to be divided between the parties. I believe, however, that this is a matter to be addressed to our Supreme Court.”
So now what will retired Justice James E. Keller, counsel for appellant on appeal, do next? He won a reversal and new trial for his client on the child custody issue because the trial court relied on hearsay, and he won on the ruling that the court should have considered introduction of a prior inconsistent statement made by a psychologist to another psychologist. I cannot ever recall seeing a party asking an appellate court to bifurcate issues, but it sure would be nice if he could take the Court of Appeals ruling back to the trial court for the new trial on the custody issue, yet file a motion for discretionary review in the Kentucky Supreme Court on the goodwill issue. The timing would be pure gold in that the Kentucky Supreme Court recently accepted discretionary review in another divorce case involving goodwill.

August 02, 2006

A Suggestion For Needed Blawgs

I came across California Supreme Court Pending Civil Cases Blog, and thought what a great idea. It is very helpful for practitioners to know particular issues of law are before a state's highest court, the outcome of which may change the law in other cases at the trial court level. Denise Howell's Bag and Baggage Blog posts about a feature of the site that allows you to request email updates for notification of future events in the case. Any takers to do that in other states, including Kentucky?

May 24, 2006

Proposed Civil Rule Change: Accelerating Appeals of Paternity, Dependency, Abuse, Neglect, Domestic Violence and Juvenile Status Offense

The Court of Appeals is already, by order, putting most of these matters on a fast track, as well as child custody cases. The proposed rule would provide:


CR 71.12(2)(a), (3)(b) and (4)(c) and (d) Briefs

Continue reading "Proposed Civil Rule Change: Accelerating Appeals of Paternity, Dependency, Abuse, Neglect, Domestic Violence and Juvenile Status Offense" »

Proposed Civil Rule Change: Where to File Family Court Appeal

Where to file an appeal has frustrated many taking an appeal from Family Court. It you know which courts are established pursuant to Ky. Const. section 110 (5) (b) and section 112 (6), this proposed rule change will clear everything up:

CR 73.01 (2): All appeals shall be taken to the next higher court by filing a notice of appeal in the court from which the appeal is taken. Appeals from family courts that are established pursuant to Ky. Const. Section 110(5)(b) or Ky. Const. Section 112(6) shall be taken to the Court of Appeals. After such filing...

Last month we digested Thorn v. Commonwealth and Sirley Robinson.


So you have it right at hand, here are the sections of the Kentucky Constitution mentioned at the outset:
Section 110 (5) (b) The Chief Justice of the Commonwealth shall be the executive head of the Court of Justice and he shall appoint such administrative assistants as he deems necessary. He shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment necessary for the prompt disposition of causes. The Chief Justice shall submit the budget for the Court of Justice and perform all other necessary administrative functions relating to the court.

Section 112 (6) The Supreme Court may designate one or more divisions of Circuit Court within a judicial circuit as a family court division. A Circuit Court division so designated shall retain the general jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and shall have additional jurisdiction as may be provided by the General Assembly.

Comment: This is not how the rule came out of the Civil Rules Committee of the Supreme Court. Adding Section 110 (5)(b) adds nothing. Rather than refer to Section 112(6) it would be better to spell it out.

May 06, 2006

Clark v. Com., Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 170 SW3d 426 (Ky.App., 2005)

Clark v. Com., Cabinet for Health and Family Services,
170 SW3d 426 (Ky.App., 2005)
Premature notice of appeal from an intermediate order may
proceed even though a second notice of appeal was not filed
from the final order.

Continue reading "Clark v. Com., Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 170 SW3d 426 (Ky.App., 2005)" »

Thorn v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Shirley Robinson, 181 SW3d 560 (Ky.App., 2005)

Thorn v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Shirley Robinson,
181 SW3d 560 (Ky.App., 2005)
Appeals from Family Court are to be taken to Court of Appeals.

Appeals from Family Court are to be taken to Court of Appeals. KRS 620.155 is
intended for use in counties that do not have a family court. When two statutes are in conflict, they are to be construed to give meaning to both.

Continue reading " Thorn v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Shirley Robinson, 181 SW3d 560 (Ky.App., 2005)" »

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