Divorce Law Journal

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Pension Beneficiary Following Divorce And Death

The U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Kennedy v. DuPont. The Court held the plan administrator of an ERISA benefits plan should pay plan benefits to wife #1, who was the designated plan beneficiary on a designation executed during the marriage and not to wife #2, who was married to the deceased participant spouse at the time of his death. The divorce decree in question awarded 100% of the deceased participant's benefits to participant, not wife #1. However, participant failed to change his beneficiary designation after the divorce.

SCOTUS BLOG points out, The Court, however, did leave open for the future a related question: if an ex-spouse is handed the benefits by a plan manager, might they still have to be surrendered, once the payout was completed? A footnote indicated that the Court on Monday was only resolving how federal benefit law applied to the initial distribution of plan payments, not their subsequent fate.

Here is the syllabus.

New Briefs Ordered In U.S. Supreme Court ERISA Case

We posted here about the QDRO case in the United States Supreme Court (Kennedy v. Plan Adm. for DuPont Savings) and linked to the oral arguments and indirectly linked to the briefs. Now SCOTUSBLOG advises that the court has ordered an additional issue to be briefed. Just letting you know so that if the opinion is rendered upon some basis nowhere to be found in the existing briefs and arguments, that may be the reason.

QDRO Needed If Alternate Payee Gets Nothing?

I couldn’t figure out why in the world a plan administrator recently wanted a QDRO when the alternate payee was getting nothing under the Marital Settlement Agreement. Now I do. The 5th circuit ruled a QDRO was the only permissible way to release pension rights and in the absence of a QDRO the divorced spouse got it all upon the participant’s death where the employee never changed the beneficiary designation, even though she waived rights in the settlement agreement. The United States Supreme Court accepted cert and oral arguments are set next month. Here's the post from the Cornell University Law School and here is the critique from the Workplace Prof Blog.

California To Permit Same-Sex Marriage (at least for now)

Click In Re Marriage and you'll see the 172 page opinion from the Supreme Court of California today. Marcia Oddi at Indiana Law Blog posts:

Here is a report by Bob Egelko of the San Francisco Chronicle on this morning's ruling. The story begins:

10:31 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- Gays and lesbians have a constitutional right to marry in California, the state Supreme Court said today in a historic ruling that could be repudiated by the voters in November.

In a 4-3 decision, the justices said the state's ban on same-sex marriage violates the "fundamental constitutional right to form a family relationship." The ruling is likely to flood county courthouses with applications from couples newly eligible to marry when the decision takes effect in 30 days.

More:
The celebration could turn out to be short-lived, however. The court's decision could be overturned in November, when Californians are likely to vote on a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriages. Conservative religious organizations have submitted more than 1.1 million signatures on initiative petitions, and officials are working to determine if at least 694,354 of them are valid.

If the measure qualifies for the ballot and voters approve it, it will supersede today's ruling. The initiative does not say whether it would apply retroactively to annul marriages performed before November, an omission that would wind up before the courts.

Family Law Prof Blog highlighted this quote from the opinon, "In the present case, it is readily apparent that extending the designation of
marriage to same-sex couples clearly is more consistent with the probable
legislative intent than withholding that designation from both opposite-sex couples
and same-sex couples in favor of some other, uniform designation. In view of the
lengthy history of the use of the term “marriage” to describe the family
relationship here at issue, and the importance that both the supporters of the 1977
amendment to the marriage statutes and the electors who voted in favor of
Proposition 22 unquestionably attached to the designation of marriage, there can
be no doubt that extending the designation of marriage to same-sex couples, rather
than denying it to all couples, is the equal protection remedy that is most
consistent with our state’s general legislative policy and preference."

Relocation In Michigan And Edmund Fitzgerald Update (updated)

Just as the Kentucky Supreme Court has three relocation related cases pending, Michigan has been struggling with the issue. Here is Jeanne Hannah's post Mom's relocation of 91 miles causes change in custody in Updates In Michicgan Family Law.
Nearly a year ago I wrote about a missed opportunity to meet Jeanne at this post. Marcia Oddi dubbed it the adventure of the Edmund Fitzgerald and I promptly forwarded the haunting score to my hosts, who were not very amused. But, ha! They invited me back and we're planning to cruise up Jeanne's way again this summer. The one lesson I learned, though, is that you really can't plan when traveling by water. So, Jeanne, if I'm nearby I'll give you a call, but no advance dinner plans. :)
UPDATE: Marcia Oddi writes, Actually it is "The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald."
See this excellent video, accompanied by the Gordon Lightfoot vocal.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEwEfti7gRk. Thanks!

Simcox v. Simcox (6th Circuit) Hague Abduction, Grave Risk Of Harm

Digest from the 6th Circuit Blog: Simcox v. Simcox, Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland
BOGGS, Chief Judge. Claire Simcox appeals from the decision of the district court ordering her to return to Mexico with two of the four children currently residing with her in Ohio, which return the district court found was required under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Convention”) and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. Because of evidence of serious abuse to both Mrs. Simcox and the children at the hands of Mr. Simcox, the district court conditioned return of the children on certain “undertakings” designed to ameliorate the risk of harm to them upon their return to Mexico. Although we agree with much of the district court’s legal analysis of the Hague Convention, its ordered undertakings are problematic on the facts of this case, particularly its command that Mrs. Simcox herself return to Mexico. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND to allow the court to reconsider what conditions, if any, could ensure the safety of the children in Mexico during the pendency of custody proceedings.
Jeffery Morley at International Family Law calls this case a highly significant ruling on the grave risk of harm defense to a Hague Convention international child abduction petition.

New KY Family Law Cases

No new published family law cases today from the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Last week there was one, London v. Collins, 2007 –CA-000529-ME, regarding application of KRS Chapter 403 in modification of custody established in a dependency case. Digest to follow soon.

Constitutional Challenge to Paternity Laws Dismissed By 6th Circuit For Failure to State Claim

Dubay v. Wells, decided by the 6th Circuit yesterday, denied a constitutional challenge to paternity laws, dismissing for failure to state a claim. Quotes from the Family Law Prof Blog:

The suit was brought by Father who claimed that he should not be responsible for child support when Mother had represented that she didn't want to have a child and assured him repeatedly she couldn't get pregnant. Father argued that Michigan's paternity laws violated the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause because a man does not have a similar choice as does a pregnant woman regarding abortion, adoption or raising a child.
The court found that Michigan Paternity Act does not affect any of Father’s fundamental rights because "it is not a fundamental right of any parent, male or female, to sever his or her financial responsibilities to the child after the child is born." The court further noted that it did not need to apply intermediate scrutiny because the Michigan Paternity Act and other statutes that impose the obligation of support are gender neutral. Finally, the court found that the Michigan Paternity Act withstood rational basis review because "the means that the statute uses to achieve this end–requiring support from the legal parents, and determining legal fatherhood based on the biological fatherhood–is substantially, let alone rationally, related to this legitimate, and probably important, government purpose."

Kansas High Court Rules Against Sperm Donor

David Klepper, Topeka correspondent to the Kansas City Star reports on the decision last Friday denying a sperm donor any rights to the child, as there was no written agreement.

In a 4-2 decision, the court held that the state law is justified and clear: if Hendrix wanted a relationship with the children, he should have put it in writing. “Generally speaking, mere ignorance of the law is no excuse for failing to abide by it,” reads the decision, written by Justice Carol Beier.

“He (the donor) can unilaterally refuse to participate unless a written agreement on his terms exists,” Beier wrote. “After donation, the male cannot force the fatherhood issue.”

The story continues

Most states, including Missouri, have laws prohibiting donors from having parental rights over children conceived through artificial insemination. The challenge to the Kansas law was watched by family law attorneys across the country.

Twenty-two family law experts submitted friend of the court briefs. All but one sided with the woman and the state law, saying it was necessary to protect the rights of children and their mothers, as well as the donor, from custody and child support lawsuits.

Linda Henry Elrod, a family law professor at Washburn University who submitted a brief in Hendrix’s favor, said a better state law would require donors to sign a contract waiving their rights as parents.

State Can Be Granted Custody Of Out Of Control Child When Parents Are Fit

Court holds that parents do not have to be found unfit for state to be granted custody of out of control mentally ill child, an interesting post from LawReader re a Washington decision.

FLA: Bio-Dad Loses to Husband In Florida

Lohman v. Carnahan, online, decided September 19, 2007 by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal. held where the husband and wife have decided to raise the child of their marriage and to accept all the rights and responsibilities of parenthood, a man who may have contributed his DNA to the child has no statutory or constitutional right to intrude into that private decision.

Maryland Rejects Same Sex Marriage

All 224 pages of Maryland's highest court decision in Conaway v. Deane that there is no fundamental right to marry someone of the same sex, that same sex orientation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, that denial of same sex marriage is not a violation of equal protection and that denial of the right to marry someone of the same sex served a legitimate governmental objective can be found here.

Maine Supreme Court Rules Lesbian Couple May Adopt

The Family Law Prof Blog reports:

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court ruled unanimously today that state law does not preclude unmarried couples from jointly petitioning to adopt a child. The case involved a lesbian couple who had petitioned to adopt a 10-year-old girl and her 6-year-old brother, for whom the couple had been foster parents since 2001.

The court decided the case solely as a matter of statutory construction, reasoning that if it read the statute to prohibit joint petitions by unmarried persons, the statute would still clearly allow successive petitions by unmarried persons, leading to the same end result. "With this in mind, construing section 9-301 as prohibiting a joint petition by unmarried persons elevates form over substance to an illogical degree." In terms of reading the statute to effectuate the purposes of adoption law, the court noted that joint petitions serve the best interests of children in a variety of ways, by insuring continuity of care should one parent die, by enabling access to broader range of benefits from two parents rather than one, and "Most importantly, a joint adoption affords the adopted children the love, nurturing, and support of not one, but two parents."

Adoption of MA (Maine Supreme Court August 30, 2007)

The opinion is online.

I recently met with Christine Sun, an ACLU staff attorney, about our firm doing some pro bono appellate work and this was one issue we would like to see addressed in Kentucky. Same-sex adoption is legal in Indiana as we reported here, linking to an Indiana Law Blog post.

South Dakota Supreme Court Holds that Child Should Keep Stepfather's Last Name

Family Law Prof Blog directs us to a new twist on the third party bio-dad of a child born during a marriage. What name should the child have? In the Matter of the Change of Name of L.M.G., (South Dakota August 8, 2007) , found here, Prof. Barbara Glesner Fines summarizes the court's ruling:

The Supreme Court of South Dakota in a 3-2 ruling has held that a girl conceived when her mother had an affair must keep the last name of her mother's husband, overruling the trial court order that had changed the child's name to that of her biological father. The child's mother reconciled with her husband before the child was born and her husband's name was on the child's birth certificate. The majority found that the daughter, now 3, should have the same last name as everyone else in the home in which she lives.

The Supreme Court majority said it is in the child's best interest to keep the same last name as that of her mother, stepfather and half-sister. "It makes no sense to change her name after two years to her natural father's name," Justice Richard Sabers wrote for the court majority. "From the standpoint of her best interest, her name should remain the same as her family unit because she socializes with them, will go to school with them and live with them the majority of the time. Why should she be unnecessarily required to explain why her surname is different from her family unit in all these circumstances?" The majority opinion said the circuit judge placed too much importance on the possibility that the girl's mother and stepfather might get divorced. Tiede also disregarded testimony that indicated the relationship was improving among the mother, biological father and stepfather, the justices said.

The two dissenting justices would have given deference to the trial judge. The trial judge had concluded that not allowing the name change might lead to estrangement with the biological father, who had visitation rights with the child for the past two years. "With the high divorce rate and increased numbers of blended families, it is not unusual for a child to have a different surname than the child's mother or half-siblings," Justice Judith Meierhenry wrote. Justice Steve Zinter also dissented, saying he believes the court majority mistakenly focused on only one factor whereas most name change cases focus on a variety of factors.

More On Whether Same Sex Relationships Terminate Maintenance

New York Divorce Report directs us to posts about recent decisions in Virginia, Oregon and California.

Failure To Plead Prenup Is Failure to Plead Affirmative Defense And Bars Court Consideration Of Agreement

A recent Missouri case holds that a party seeking to enforce a prenup must raise the issues in a pleading. Failure to do so prevents the court from enforcing the prenup. Homan v. Holman, which can be found here.

In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth all applicable affirmative defenses and avoidances . . . . A pleading that sets forth an affirmative defense or avoidance shall contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to the defense or avoidance.[(FN3)]

"An affirmative defense is waived if the party raising it does not plead it." In re Estate of Kilbourn, 898 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Mo.App. 1995).

Based on the foregoing, we determine the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Husband to introduce the Agreement at trial because Husband failed to assert the Agreement as an affirmative defense in his pleadings. It has long been held that "[m]atters seeking avoidance of a valid contract are affirmative defenses and must be set out in the pleadings." Id. The terms of the Agreement clearly provide "'additional facts [other than the statutory considerations of section 452.300] that permit [Husband] to avoid the legal responsibility alleged'" by Wife, i.e., that there was marital property to be divided. Smith v. Thomas, 210 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Mo.App. 2006) (quoting Mobley v. Baker, 72 S.W.3d 251, 257-58 (Mo.App. 2002)). A party that fails to raise an affirmative defense in his pleadings, waives that issue at trial. In re Estate of Kilbourn, 898 S.W.2d at 586.

Revocation of Acknowlegment of Paternity - What's a "Mistake of Fact?"

Here is an interesting new Michigan case courtesy of Jeanne Hannah at Updates In Michigan Family Law.

To Be Tax Deductible Alimony Must Terminate On Death Of Recipient

You can read Hinson v. Commissioner, US Tax Court Summary Opinion 2007-92 (June 7, 2007) here. The code is quite clear that to be taxable income/tax deductible, alimony (maintenance) must terminate on the dearth of the payee. The Family Law Prof Blog reports:

The tax court, in a recent summary opinion, provides a good example for our students of the importance of careful drafting in light of the interrelationship between the tax code and state law when determining the tax consequences of divorce. In this case, the divorce decree provided that Husband would pay Wife $1200 a month in “rehabilitative alimony” and an additional $72,000 in “lump-sum alimony”, payable in installments of $600 a month. The decree did not indicate whether this lump sum
award would terminate upon Wife’s death.

Under section 71(b) of the tax code, alimony is not deductible if it does not terminate upon the payee spouse’s death. Because the Florida courts have held that an award of lump-sum alimony survives the death of both the obligor and the obligee, the alimony was not properly deductible.

Grandparent Visitation Practice Pointers

Following the digest of Keenan v Dawson, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No 265725, decided June 5, 2007, Updates In Michigan Family Law gives some great practice pointers in handling grandparent visitation cases.

Michigan Order Allowing Duped Dad Reimbursement For $55,000 In Child Support Reversed

Michigan is struggling with the same paternity challenges as Kentucky. Updates In Michigan Family Law reports:

Challenges to parentage determinations are becoming more common today than ever before. One factor seems to be a focus on “duped dads,” many of whom want to get out of paying child support for a child now found to be unrelated to them, but named as their child or children in a judgment of divorce. Another factor is the ready availability of DNA evidence. Home DNA testing is common and can provide a basis for a motion to set aside a child support order. Of course, home DNA testing doesn’t provide the controls of court-ordered DNA testing by a reputable lab with its control on the production of DNA samples. A question left undecided in a recent Michigan court of appeals case is whether the court had the actual authority to order a DNA test.

The Michigan Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decision on June 5, 2007 held that a duped dad who had paid child support since 1999 was not entitled to set aside the judgment of divorce in order to obtain reimbursement for over $50,000 in child support paid between 1999 and the date he filed his motion to terminate child support on January 20, 2005. Because the mother’s fraud was intrinsic fraud, a court rule and also well-established case law precluded the trial court to grant this ex-husband relief from the 1999 judgment. He had only one year to challenge to the judgment that ordered child support. Public policy, the court rule, and case law limit the time for motions to set aside judgments in order to preserve finality of judgments. The ex-husband did not challenge the child support order/judgment until 2005—after the mother asked for parenting time provisions to be enforced and for an increase in child support.

Because the ex-husband could not be given relief from judgment, the trial court was limited by Michigan law from retroactive modification of the child support order. The modification could only be retroactive to the date that he filed his motion regarding child support. As a result, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order that the mother had to repay to the father almost $55,000 in child support that he had paid under the judgment.

The mother argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the equitable parent doctrine should have been applied. Citing Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320 (1999) and Killingbeck v Killingbeck, 269 Mich App 132 (2005), the court of appeals stated that this doctrine has never been applied outside of the context of marriage. The child in this case was born several years prior to the parties’ marriage.

Here is the opinion.

Birth Certificate Does Not Require Name Of Mother In Md. Surrogacy Case

The 56 page Maryland decision in In Re Roberto d B. rendered last week can be found here. KRISTEN WYATT, Associated Press, Wednesday, May 16, 2007 writes:

A surrogate mother who has no genetic connection to the baby she is carrying
does not have to be listed as the mother on a birth certificate, Maryland's
highest court ruled Wednesday.

The case arose from twins born in the Washington suburbs in 2001. The woman
who carried the twins for a father used an egg donor and had no genetic
relationship to them. Both she and the father did not want her listed as the
mother.

In a 4-3 decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that the babies are
not required to have a mother listed on birth papers.

"Maryland's breaking ground here," said Dorrance Dickens, a Washington
lawyer who argued the case for the father and the surrogate mother.

Though judges routinely allow blank spaces for mothers on birth certificates
in surrogate cases, Dickens said Maryland's court is the first to use a
state Equal Rights Amendment to make the decision.

More on: Does Avowal of Fatherhood Impose an 'Equitable Paternity' - Indiana

The Indiana Law Blog has an exhaustive post updating us on Indiana law in this area after some excellent hand-picked excerpts from Andrew Wolfson's article in yesterday's Courier-Journal. Check it out.

Same Sex Cohabitation Terminates Maintenance Notwithstanding Gay Marriage Ban

One of the questions we pondered as states passed DOMAs and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage was what effect such would have on divorces between heterosexuals. Larry O'Dell,
Associated Press Writer, Richmond, Va. wrote about a recent Virginia Court of Appeals ruling, Stroud v. Stroud in which same-sex cohabitation terminated a contractual obligation to pay maintenance. His story is here. Some excerpts:

University of Richmond law professor Carl Tobias said the appeals court seemed to be treating same-sex couples the same as heterosexual couples--but only in the narrow analysis of contract law, not the broader public policy context.

Chris Freund, spokesman for conservative Family Foundation of Virginia, said the ruling proves that opponents of last year's constitutional amendment prohibiting gay marriages and civil unions were wrong in claiming the measure would interfere with private contract rights.

"Today's decision is simply about a contract between two people and has nothing to do with how the Commonwealth of Virginia defines or recognizes marriage," he said.

But David Spratt, former chairman of the Virginia Bar Association's Domestic Relations Section, said the ruling could have more far-reaching consequences depending on how this area of the law evolves.

"The legislature certainly does not recognize same-sex relationships as anything--they don't even recognize the capacity of same-sex couples to contract," said Spratt, now a legal rhetoric professor at American University, Washington College of Law. "So the fact that a court is saying a relationship between same-sex couples can be analogous to marriage is important."

He noted that Virginia law defines adultery as sexual intercourse between a married person and someone of the opposite sex. By recognizing same-sex cohabitation, the court could provide the impetus to change the adultery law to cover homosexual acts, Spratt suggested. Such legislation died in the session that ended Saturday.

The gay-rights group Equality Virginia, which opposed the so-called "marriage amendment" that was approved by voters in November, had no immediate response to Tuesday's ruling.

'Lawrence' Fails to Open Floodgates to Unfettered Sexual Freedom

'Lawrence' Fails to Open Floodgates to Unfettered Sexual Freedom is the title of an article by Howard J. Bashman published here as a special to Law.com March 5, 2007. Those in the blogosphere know Howard as the author of the excellent blog, How Appealing. I am pleased the article mentioned his private practice, a litigation boutique in Willow Grove, Pa., a suburb of Philadelphia. Here are some excerpts:

Perhaps owing to the nation's puritanical origins, in the United States we love to legislate about sex -- even sex between consenting adults or between consenting adults and inanimate objects.

In the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 ruling in Lawrence v. Texas invalidating a Texas ban on homosexual sodomy between willing adult participants, many wondered whether other laws regulating sexual conduct between consenting adults would be vulnerable to legal challenge.

If two recently issued appellate court rulings are any indication, the post-Lawrence fears of those concerned that public morality would no longer remain a valid basis for legislating consensual sexual conduct have proven to be overblown. Instead, these rulings demonstrate that, even where consenting adults are involved, Lawrence has failed to usher in an "anything goes" era, free from governmental interference.

In the more recent of the two rulings, the Supreme Court of Ohio late last month rejected a man's challenge to a state law that criminalizes sexual conduct between a stepparent and stepchild even if both are adults and unrelated by blood, and both willingly participate in the conduct. In seeking to challenge the law as unconstitutional as applied to his case, the stepfather argued that Ohio had no legitimate interest in regulating sex between consenting adults.

However, Ohio's highest court disagreed by a vote of 6 to 1. The majority's opinion observed that "Lawrence did not announce a 'fundamental' right to all consensual adult sexual activity, let alone consensual sex with one's adult children or stepchildren." The Ohio justices found that, while the Texas statute in Lawrence was unconstitutional under the so-called "rational basis" test, a rational basis existed for Ohio to prohibit even consensual sex between a stepparent and an unrelated stepchild.

The legitimate interest that the Ohio court recognized was the state's interest in protecting the family unit and family relationships. The Supreme Court of Ohio went on to recognize that if the stepfather and stepdaughter wished to have the ability to engage in sexual relations free from government regulation, they could do so -- if the stepfather divorced the stepdaughter's biological mother.

He had this to say about the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision that resulted from an effort to invalidate an Alabama law prohibiting the commercial distribution of sex toys and the fallout from Lawrence:

The 11th Circuit's opinion explains: "[T]he ACLU argues [that] this case is indistinguishable from Lawrence -- just as in that case, in this case there is no legitimate state interest, including public morality, that supports the challenged Alabama statute."

But the 11th Circuit disagreed, observing that "while the statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized private sexual conduct, the statute at issue in this case forbids public, commercial activity."

Thus, the 11th Circuit ruled, "we find that public morality survives as a rational basis for legislation even after Lawrence, and we find that in this case the State's interest in the preservation of public morality remains a rational basis for the challenged statute."

For that reason, the court affirmed the Alabama federal district court's most recent ruling in the case and refused to invalidate that state's statute prohibiting the commercial distribution of sex toys.

In the immediate aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, legitimate questions arose concerning the likely fate of other laws seeking to regulate the sexual conduct of consenting adults. Now, nearly five years later, it appears that the impact of the Lawrence ruling has been far more limited than many had initially hoped -- or feared.

6th Circuit Affirms Dismissal For Lack Of Jurisdiction Under Alien Tort Claims Act

Taveras v. Taveraz, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 2007), 2007 WL 494928 (C.A.6 (Ohio)

Issue and Holding:
Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the parental child abduction action pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute. The Court held no, the district court did not have jurisdiction.

Facts:

Both parties are citizens of the Dominican Republic. During their marriage, two children were born. In 2003 the couple divorced in the Dominican Republic, and Ms. Taveraz was granted full guardianship of the children. In August 2004 Ms. Taveraz took the children under a visitor’s visa to the United States, allegedly for a two week vacation. In September 2004, Ms. Taveraz contacted Mr. Taveras and told him that she was never returning to the Dominican Republic. Mr. Taveras then discovered her and the children were living in Ohio.
Mr. Taveras filed a criminal complaint and a civil action in the Dominican Republic. In July 2005 the Santo Domingo family court ordered the return of Ms. Taveraz and the children to the Dominican Republic to appear for a hearing. However, they never returned.
In September 2005 Mr. Taveras filed an action against Ms. Taveraz in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging parental child abduction pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution, the Hague Convention of 1980, and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act. Ms. Taveraz moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Taveras then amended his complaint to include a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute (hereinafter ATS). The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Taveras appealed only the district court’s denial of subject matter jurisdiction under ATS.

Analysis:

The United States Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), that at the time ATS was enacted only three actions were generally recognized as infractions of the law of nations: piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts. The Court also held that other causes of action based upon present day law of nations may be cognizable under the ATS if the claim both “rest[s] on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and [is] defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the [aforementioned] 18th-century paradigms[.]” Id. at 725.
In the instant case, the Court rejected Mr. Taveras’ argument that Ms. Taveraz’s actions violated the terms for safe conducts under the law of nations. The Court noted that the purpose of the doctrine of safe conducts was to protect the safety and property of the journeying alien bearing the safe conduct privilege. Therefore, there was no violation of the terms for safe conducts under the law of nations, since there was no infraction of the safe passages of Ms. Taveraz or the children to, within, or out of the United States and there was no injury to their person or property. The Court also found, even assuming Ms. Taveraz’s entry into the United States constituted a violation of the law of nations, that there was an insufficient nexus between this violation and the alleged tort committed against Mr. Taveras. Mr. Taveras’ reliance on Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961) was misplaced.
The Court also rejected Mr. Taveras’ argument that an international consensus against parental child abduction is established through the Hague Convention of 1980, the Hague Convention of 1996, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Court found that Mr. Taveras failed to produce sufficient evidence that there is an international consensus that the sort of parental child abduction alleged in the complaint is a wrong so generally and universally recognized that it becomes a violation of the law of nations pursuant to ATS.
Finally, the Court held that the district court did not have federal question jurisdiction over the complaint either.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Paternity Test: Florida 'Father' May Cite Law To Cry Fraud

Parker v. Parker, from the Supreme Court of Florida was decided February 1, 2007. The parties married in 1996, the child was born in 1998, a 2001 divorce decree incorporated an agreement for child support and the husband did not have a paternity test until 2003. The wife's misrepresentation of paternity was held to be intrinsic fraud and therefore a husband must seek relief from a judgment within one year.

We recognize that the former husband in this case may feel victimized. However, Theresa Glennon argues cogently that:
[w]hile some individuals are innocent victims of deceptive partners, adults are aware of the high incidence of infidelity and only they, not the children, are able to act to ensure that the biological ties they may deem essential are present. . . . The law should discourage adults from treating children they have parented as expendable when their adult relationships fall apart. It is the adults who can and should absorb the pain of betrayal rather than inflict additional betrayal on the involved children.
[Mary J. Anderlik, Disestablishment Suits: What Hath Science Wrought?, 4 J. Center for Families, Child. & Cts. 3, 18 (2003)] (quoting Theresa Glennon, Expendable Children: Defining Belonging in a Broken World, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 269, 275 (2001)).

The Miami Herald reported the story yesterday, Paternity test: 'Father' may cite law to cry fraud.

In delving into the often-vicious world of divorce and paternity cases, the high court failed to discuss Florida's ''paternity fraud'' law that the Legislature passed last year, when male lawmakers inveighed against deceptive women, and female legislators fretted about callous men abandoning children.

The new law gives men the right to avoid child-support payments if they gain ''newly discovered evidence'' that the child isn't theirs. The law requires the man to file a court petition 90 days after getting the paternity test.

Whether it will apply to Parker's long-standing case or other old paternity cases in the courts is unclear, said his Miami lawyer, Scott A. Lazar, who is considering filing a challenge under the new law. Lazar said he's sure the law will help blunt what would be a bad result from Thursday's court ruling.

''If there was not this new law, the effect of this decision would make paternity an issue in every divorce case,'' Lazar said. ``The advice you would have to give your client is to get a paternity test now, otherwise, he couldn't do anything after a year if the child isn't his.''

Query: If the new statute wasn't argued on appeal, how does this obligor expect relief in his case?

Thanks to Howard Basham at How Appealing for posting the link to the case and to Marcia Oddi at Indiana Law Blog for letting me know it was available online. Stan Billingsly at LawReader also reports on the recent unpublished opinions that address the issue in Kentucky from an equitable estoppel argument. However, now that we have the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Denzek (see post here and digest here) damages for fraud can be obtained very late in a child's life in Kentucky.

Tennessee Court Orders that Daughter Be Returned to Chinese Parents after Seven Years in Custody of Foster Parents

We have been reading the news (New York Times, USA Today) of the Memphis child who will be returned in days to her biological parents, after being raised by another family for seven years. I have been waiting to see the Tennessee opinion, which is now online. I am glad I waited for the opinion before posting the news, because I was glad to learn there will be a reunification plan rather than a disastrous delivery of the child. The Family Law Prof Blog digests the case:

The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Anna Mae He (see Nov. 27, 2005 Family Law Prof post) reversing the termination of the parental rights of the Chinese couple who seven years ago had given their daughter to a couple in Tennessee for foster care. The trial court had predicated the termination on the ground that the parents abandoned A.M.H. by willfully failing to visit her for four months. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, "because the undisputed evidence shows that there was animosity between the parties and that the parents were actively pursuing custody of A.M.H. through legal proceedings during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, ...the trial court erred in finding a willful failure to visit..... we conclude that the parents’ consent to transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the appellees was not made with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer. Therefore, according the parents those superior rights to the custody of their child that constitutional law mandates, only a showing of substantial harm that threatens the child’s welfare may deprive the parents of the care and custody of A.M.H. Although A.M.H. has now been with the appellees for more than seven years, six of those years elapsed after the parents’ first unsuccessful legal filing to regain custody. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers during the pendency of the litigation does not constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody." The Court remanded for determination of a reunification plan.

Appeals: Bifurcated Issues

The Family Law Prof Blog posts Case Law Development: Bifurcating Judgment Precludes Appeal:

A recent inquiry from a reader asked whether bifurcated judgments in divorce actions may be separately appealed. Here is at least one court's answer...
Rather than simply enter temporary orders, a divorce court will sometimes bifurcate a divorce judgment, granting divorce or child custody for example, and reserving judgment of financial issues pending more factual development or hearings. However, the Illinois court has held that such a bifurcated judgment is not final for purposes of appeal. In this case, the trial judge entered a judgment of dissolution, divided the marital property, granted sole custody of the children to petitioner, set child support of $1,306.95 a month, and barred respondent from receiving maintenance. However, it "reserved" the issues of visitation, the children's post-high-school educational expenses, and petitioner's maintenance. Raising the issue sua sponte, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that "The reservation of issues here deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal." -- No bifurcating appeals.
Mardjetko v. Mardjetko, 2007 Ill. App. Lexis 3 (January 5, 2007)
Opinion on the web (last visited January 15, 2007 bgf)

I had asked Professor Barbara Glesner Fines, Ruby M. Hulen Professor of Law, University of Missouri Kansas City to keep a "heads up" for cases that may give insight on whether issues may be bifurcated on a motion for discretionary review, so that some issues could be remanded to the trial court for a new trial while others go up on issues of law to a state's highest court. I very much appreciate her keeping this on her radar.

Ex-Spouse Remains Insurance Beneficiary Despite Law Change If Policy Issued Before Bill Took Effect

(Jan. 3, 2007) In a unanimous decision announced today, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that, regardless of the date on which a married couple was divorced, 1990 legislation that ‘automatically' terminates all life insurance beneficiary designations in favor of a former spouse at the time of a divorce does not apply to insurance contracts that were in effect prior to the effective date of that legislation.

Section 1339.63 of the Ohio Revised Code, which took effect on May 31, 1990, provides that upon the termination of a marriage by divorce, dissolution, or annulment, all life insurance beneficiary designations in favor of a former spouse are automatically terminated unless the divorce decree specifically provides otherwise. In today's decision, Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton affirmed lower court rulings that R.C. 1339.63 does not affect insurance contracts that were in effect prior to May 31, 1990, because retroactive application of the statute to pre-existing policies would violate the Contracts Clause of the Ohio Constitution.

In re Estate of Holycross
This summary was prepared by the Office of Public Information for the general public and news media. Opinion summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered noteworthy or of great public interest. The court site cautions that opinion summaries are not to be considered as official headnotes or syllabi of Court opinions.
The joys of courts sending out decisons via RSS feeds, and a digest, no less!

Improper Factors in Calculating Maintenance

From The Family law Prof Blog: "The Supreme Court of Connecticut has affirmed the court of appeals ruling in a case in which a couple were married for 11 years, lived together for a number of years and then remarried for six years." (See Family Law Prof Blog post of February 10, 2006) "The court of appeals had found that the trial court, in fixing the term of the maintenance award, improperly took into consideration both the prior marriage and cohabitation and the fact that there were adult children with grandchildren residing in the house."
"The court concludes that 'length of the marriage' criterion prescribed in [statutes governing maintenance awards], as a matter of law, does not include prior marriages or cohabitation preceding the marriage."
My tech learning curve stopped at posting .pdf docs. so here's the not so pretty link to the opinion:http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR280/280cr8.pdf. Maybe early next year I can find a little time with a fire blazing in the fireplace to putter with the tech stuff, much like earlier this year when I gave this site a soft launch.

Uniform State Laws Research Tip

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has a valuable website for legal research, www.nccusl.org, to which all the uniform acts are posted, as is the legislative history of each of the acts by state, and all the comments to the uniform acts. I learned of this on the ABA Family Law Section listserve, where the discussion concerned whether one state, when modifying child support, could extend the support beyond the age of majority of the original state issuing the first order. The child support "Goddess", Laura Morgan, who knows everything there is to know about child support, informed us that all you have to do is pull up the comments to UIFSA at and search for the word "successive," and you will find that the answer is quite clearly no. The legislature declares the public policy by enacting a uniform law, and the courts may not declare a contrary public policy, so the erstwhile decisions in New Jersey and New York are off base. Now you know how to find the comments to the Uniform Laws.
And, speaking of Uniform Laws, I had heard The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act was approved by the NCCUSL. I am please to now post the link to it.

Same-Sex Custody Jurisdiction

In an important decision last week, Janet Miller-Jenkins v. Lisa Miller-Jenkins, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that Virginia must give full faith and credit under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act to a custody determination made by a Vermont court growing out of a Vermont civil union. The opinion determined that DOMA did not create an exception to the PKPA and that both statutes must be given effect.

Courts May Not Enjoin Parents From Collecting on Child Support Arrearage Judgments

The Family Law Prof Blog digests Leopold v. Leopold, 2006 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 631 (October 20, 2006). "The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's order in a child support modification case in which the trial court had set a repayment schedule for child support arrearages and had then ordered that mother could not pursue any other enforcement actions so long as father was making the court ordered payments. The court of appeals noted that such a restriction on the mother's private collection efforts was in error, especially given the paucity of the repayment schedule the court had ordered."

No Duty to Disclose Pending Sales Discussions of Property in Divorce Settlement

Oh, dear; this cannot be good public policy. Divorce courts should be requiring no-holds-barred open disclosure. This decision will create or perpetuate a culture of trickery in litigation.
It is beyond comprehension that the sale of business for $225 million could take place in one month. When the seller signed this divorce agreement he had to have known there was a buyer in the wings or a contract pending. Those of us doing divorce work for many years would probably be willing to bet our homes that the deal was really done long before, but pen not put to paper until the divorce was a done deal. How often is the non-owner supposed to do discovery? Must we negotiate a deal, then take a final round of depositions? Sorry to report two poor decisions in the same week.
Here's the entire digest of Kojovic v. Goldman, NY App. Div. October 19, 2006.from the Family Law Prof Blog:
"The New York Court of Appeals dismissed an action to set aside a divorce settlement in a high-dollar divorce between Actress Lora Kojovic and her husband Neal Goldman, who owned a minority share of an Internet information service Capital IQ. Wife signed a divorce settlement agreement in August 2004 that gave her nearly $1.5 million. However, about one month later, Standard & Poor's purchased her husband's company for $225 million, with his share being $18 million. Wife then brought an action to set aside the settlement agreement on the basis of fraud and unconscionability.
Wife argued that husband affirmatively misrepresented the liquidity of the company and the talks that were underway for purchase of the company. However, the court disagreed, finding that husband had disclosed the assets and that it was up to wife to inquire further. However, wife, who had been represented by counsel in negotiating the agreement, had acknowledged that she had the right to inquire

The Relationship of Biology to Legal Fatherhood

The Relationship of Biology to Legal Fatherhood: Two New Cases Show Courts Struggling to Find a Coherent Approach, As Non-Biological Fathers Fight for Their Rights to Children
Decided the same week as the Kentucky Court Appeals case of Hinshaw v. Hinsaw was a Tennessee decision, In Re: T.K.Y., which held for the bio-dad rather than the husband. Joanna Grossman, professor of law at Hofstra University digests both cases and points out a big factual difference: the bio-dad in Tennessee wanted to be named the legal father, while in Hinshaw the alleged bio-dad never stepped up to the plate. The Hinshaw case is not final; a motion for discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court is pending.

Expected Inheritance: Divorce Relevancy

An Alaska case last month is causing quite a stir.
Krize v. Krize, Alaska Supreme Court, September 29, 2006
"Where the beneficiary remains on generally good terms with the donor, and particularly where the donor is a parent or other close family member, it is a rare case where the expected gift or inheritance will completely fail to yield any benefits at all. The better position, therefore is that the court may consider an expected gift or inheritance as one relevant factor in dividing the marital estate. Of course, the weight of a future gift or inheritance as a division factor should depend heavily upon the degree of likelihood that benefits will actually be received...
We therefore conclude that it is not inherently improper for a court to consider the possibility of inheritance in some cases. Because property divisions cannot be reopened, however, courts must be cautious in using this factor. On remand, the court should permit further discovery on this issue and on the extent to which Robert's interests have vested. Interests that have already vested may be considered as an asset of the beneficiary when the superior court divides the property."

Stopping Vexatious Litigation After Divorce

An attorney spouse brought multiple lawsuits against his ex-wife, her family, as well as several lawyers and judges. Finally, in Davey v. Dolan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68960 (September 26, 2006), digested by the Family Law Prof Blog, " the US District Court for the Southern District of New York not only dismissed all the claims for failure to state a claim or on the basis of res judicata, but also sanctioned the attorney. Under the court's inherent authority and the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Court ordered husband to pay the reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred by the defendants in responding to the action and permanently enjoined him from "(1) pursuing further federal litigation that in any way relates to any matter arising out of his matrimonial dispute without first obtaining the authorization of the District Court, and (2) pursuing further state litigation that in any way relates to any matter arising out of his matrimonial dispute without appending this Court's opinion and order of injunction to his first filings."
That federal statute provides: Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Civil Rule 11 would have supported the same fee shifting result, and in most states is not limited to attorneys. I would love to see the legal analysis of the injunctive relief. If anyone has access to the opinion or briefs, please pass them on and I will do an update.

Void As To Public Policy: Child Support Not Dependant On Child's Placement and Waiver Of Arrearages

A Wisconsin decision in Motte v. Motte, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 880 (September 27, 2006) held agreements waiving child support arrearages or estopping parents from asking for modification if children change residence are void as against public policy. The Family Law Prof Blog digests the opinion.

Race Can Be A Factor, But Not The Only Factor In Child Custody Decision

The Family Law Prof Blog points out "that the debate over how and if race should be considered in custody actions is not settled. A recent Illinois Appeals Court decision affirmed a trial judge's decision to grant sole custody of a 2-year-old bi-racial child to her African-American mother rather than her Caucasian father. The bitter custody battle included 15 days of trial, 128 exhibits and 15 witnesses (including four experts, the admissibility of whose testimony was a central issue in the appeal). The trial judge found both parents equally fit to care for the child but favored mother in part because "the mother was able to provide the child with the support she would need in a world that was potentially hostile to biracial individuals." The court considered the effect of Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) and concluded that, while race cannot be the sole factor in a custody determination, "Volumes of cases from other jurisdictions have interpreted Palmore as not prohibiting the consideration of race in matters of child custody." A strongly worded dissent argued that "Despite this court's weak protest to the contrary, the remarks in the trial court's letter of opinion show that the court's decision for custody improperly hinged on the sole factor of race: that only an African-American person can properly raise a biracial child in this society."
In re Gambla, 2006 Ill. App. LEXIS 667 (July 31, 2006)
I am suprised that this area of law is apparently not settled. I am also suprised that the Illinois trial courts have 15 days of trial time to devote to any one family.

Civil Union Partners' Custody Dispute To Be Decided in VT per PKPA and UCCJA; DOMA Does Not Trump

The Vermont Supreme Court decided a jurisdictional custody dispute between partners to a Vermont civil union, which revolved around the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The court rejected the argument that the federal Defense of Marriage Act might supersede either of those laws. Boston.com reports "The unanimous ruling in Vermont conflicts with a series of decisions in Virginia courts, which held that that state's anti-gay marriage laws controlled the case. Vermont Justice John Dooley wrote, though, that it's Vermont's laws that control the case because the women involved in the dispute were legally joined in a civil union in 2000 and that means Vermont family law governs their 2003 separation and subsequent child custody disagreement. A lawyer representing opponents of same-sex marriage said the dispute undoubtedly will have to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court."
UPDATE:
Law - Washington Post editorial provides clarity on Vermont-Virginia dispute is the headline from the Indiana Law Blog."A Washington Post editorial today cuts to the essence of the Vermont-Virginia visitation dispute. A paragraph: As the Vermont Supreme Court understood, this dispute isn't about whether Virginia is bound to honor same-sex unions. (The federal Defense of Marriage Act protects Virginia from that supposedly frightful consequence.) It's about the application of a federal law designed to help states -- and children -- avoid the sort of ugly tug of war that has ensnared Isabella here. Once one state's court has properly started hearing a case, the law provides, other states should stay out. Otherwise, parents who don't like the custody deal they got the first time could shop around for friendlier courts."The Indiana Law Blog also links to the August 5th NY Times report, written by Adam Liptak, on the Vermont Supreme Court ruling, and to the blog, How Appealing, whioh links to the Vermont Supreme Court ruling.

Increase in Child Support

"The Supreme Court of Canada sent a warning to divorced parents on Monday that they better come clean when their income goes up, or they could face sizable retroactive child support bills, " reports the Family Law Prof Blog. "The Supreme Court stopped short of ordering a duty to disclose salary increases automatically, but the judges signalled that paying parents should do so as a matter of course because children of divorce have a right to a share of an income hike."
Not only is an increase in child support not retroactive in Kentucky before a motion to modify is made, but an obligee is not even entitled to discovery of an increase in income until a motion is made.Combs v. Daugherty and Jennifer Combs, Real Party in Interest,
170 SW3d 424 (Ky.App., 2005), as digested here.

Relocation in Joint Physical Custody: Case From MA

"The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The court cited a number of authorities from other states, and a number of law review articles on the subject, along with the ALI Principles. The court observed that:
'Where physical custody is shared, the "best interest" calculus pertaining to removal is appreciably different from those situations that involve sole physical custody... Where physical custody is shared, a judge's willingness to elevate one parent's interest in relocating freely with the children is often diminished... No longer is the fortune of simply one custodial parent so tightly interwoven with that of the child; both parents have equal rights and responsibilities with respect to the children. The importance to the children of one parent's advantage in relocating outside the Commonwealth is greatly reduced.'
Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass. 177; 850 N.E.2d 513 (Modified Opinion July 27, 2006)
Opinion on web", from the Family Law Prof Blog.

Family Courts are Courts of Equity as well as of Law

Practitioners need to be reminded occasionally that Family Courts are courts of equity as well as of law, as The South Carolina Family Law Blog reports the case of Buckley v. Shealy.

Bio Dads and Non Bio Dads; the Nature or Nurture Thread Continues

"The Michigan supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ decision in Barnes v Jeudevine, in an opinion released on July 26, 2006. Docket No. 129606. As a result, Barnes, who filed an action seeking a determination of paternity of a child conceived while the child’s mother was married to another man—a child whom he co-parented for 4 ½ years, and a child who believes that Barnes is his father—is denied the opportunity to establish legal parentage. The majority opinion: The court was split 4-3 in its decision. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Weaver, held that a default judgment of divorce stating that it appears that “no children were born of this marriage and none are expected” is not clear and convincing evidence that the child was not an issue of the marriage. Thus, the marital presumption applies and Barnes is deprived of standing to sue to determine his legal parentage of the child. " From Updates in Michigan Family Law, which also provides significant criticism and commentary, which includes, "Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a father such as Barnes would be permitted to rebut the presumption of legitimacy because he, as well as the ex-husband, would be a “presumed father.” The UPA would move Michigan along in parentage actions in the direction that California has done judicially, recognizing the rights of fathers to establish parentage where they’ve formed a bonded, parent-child relationship with their child, despite the mother’s marital status. See, for example, a case in which the facts are not terribly dissimilar to Barnes: Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal. App.4th 1198 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 294]. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3. "
These dual dad cases can bring heartbreaking consequences for children and their nurturers as Sandra G. Ragland reported in our initial post on this thread, Nature or Nurture, Should Genetic Test Results Be Admissible to Rebut the Presumption of Paternity? While the Uniform Parentage Act is not perfect, our legislatures MUST wrestle with these issues.
UPDATE: The Family Law Prof Blog posted on this, too, and links to a video interview with one of the dads.
UPDATE: The Updates in Michigan Family Law posts a follow-up discussion today. Unlike Michigan, when an acknowledgment of patenity is signed the parents become joinet legal custodians.

Collusive Divorce

There are two good posts on a new collusive divorce case, one from Updates in Michigan Family Law and the other from the Family Law Prof Blog.

Prenuptial Agreement, Enforcement Of All But One Provision

The New York Law Journal, July 18, 2006, discusses a new case that enforced all but the attorney fee restriction of a prenuptial agreement. "An appeals court in Brooklyn has declared unenforceable provisions of a prenuptial agreement that barred a spouse from seeking attorney fees. A lawyer on the case said the decision was the first in which an appeals court had nullified part of a prenuptial agreement concerning attorney fees, rather than the whole agreement. A unanimous panel of the Appellate Division, 2nd Department, said its ruling was a matter of public policy, considering the wealth of the husband -- his assets are valued at nearly $5.6 million -- compared to the wife, whose assets are valued at $160,000. It stressed, however, that it was not commenting on all such provisions in prenuptial agreements. Each similar case should be reviewed individually, the court said. 'The enforceability of a provision of a prenuptial agreement waiving the right to seek an award of an attorney's fee presents a clash of two competing public policies -- that in favor of resolving marital issues by agreement and that in favor of assuring that matrimonial matters are determined by parties operating on a level playing field,' Justice David S. Ritter wrote for the court in Kessler v. Kessler, 2004-04773."
Sorry that I didn't find either the Journal article or the case online to which I could link.
UPDATE: Thanks to Jeanne Hannah at Updates In Michigan Family Law for providing the online access to
The New Tork Law Journal article, "Prenuptial Pact's Attorney Fee Provision Nullified" by Tom Perrotta and the link to Kessler v. Kessler.

Moral of the story: Do Not Remarry Until Decree Entered and Final

Read the new Nevada case of McClintock v. McClintock, which demonstrates the soundness of advice from attorneys that parties not remarry until Divorce Decree entered and final, from the Family Law Prof Blog.

Nature Or Nurture, The Cases Keep Coming, Support Rather Than Custody This Time

An interesting decision from New Jersey, digested by Charles Abut on the ABA Family Law listserve:
J.R. v. L.R., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div.); New Jersey App. Div., July 17, 2006
"On the biological father's appeal from an order requiring he and his daughter's psychological father each to pay child support, held :
(1) the biological father was properly ordered to submit to genetic testing, even though he was unaware of his 12-year-old daughter until shortly before the action commenced and even though he wanted nothing to do with her;
(2) equitable estoppel did not make the psychological father solely responsible for the daughter's support, absent interference by the psychological father with support from the biological father; and
(3)although the biological father had the primary support obligation, it was proper for him to share the obligation with the psychological father because the biological father could not pay the entire amount of support. "
The Family Law Prof Blog also reports on this case.

Jeanne Hannah Posts on Roe v. Wade for Men

Updates in Michigan Family Law blog nicely digests and links to the Roe v. Wade For Men 6th Circuit decision that was rendered this week, which rejected the theory as frivolous. We reported on this pending case in March, link here.
Jeanne Hannah's blawg is quite good and we're adding a link to it under "Other Family Law Blogs." Having recently spent some time on Lake Michigan, I don't see how she can possibly make time to blog in Traverse City in the summer! She beat the new Sixth Circuit Blog to reporting on the decision, but arising from a Michigan case, I am sure it is very newsworthy there.
UPDATE: More on the story from The Art of Divorce and MLive.com.

Divorce After Death

From Law.com: "Lawyers in several states are examining the legal question of posthumous divorces in light of recent probate law changes and a handful of unusual lawsuits that deal with spouses who died during divorce proceedings."