Divorce Law Journal

New Ky Ethics Rules Online

Here is the link to the sweeping new ethical rules issued by the Kentucky Supreme Court last week. We all will have to study them carefully. They become effective July 15, 2009.

Thomas v. Thomas, Ky, Delinquent Entry Of Decree, New Hearing Not Required

THOMAS V. THOMAS
DELINQUENT ENTRY OF DECREE
2006-SC-000526-DG
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
PANEL: NOBLE PRESIDING; ABRAMSON, CUNNINGHAM, SCHRODER AND SCOTT CONCUR; LAMBERT, C.J. CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY
COUNTY: GALLOWAY

Ex-Wife raised 2 claims of error to SC: (1) that CA erred in affirming TC’s decision not to grant a hearing on evidence arising subsequent to DRC’s oral ruling ; and (2) that CA improperly applied the facts and holdings of Dubick v. Dubick, 653 S.W.2d 652 (Ky.App. 1983) to the case.

DRC took the parties’ dissolution action under consideration for final hearing on April 27, 2000. At the hearing's close, DRC issued oral ruling from the bench and directed Ex-Wife's attorney to draft an Order. That Order was never drafted by Ex-Wife's attorney and neither party brought this fact to TC’s attention. No action was taken to finalize the divorce until, four years later, Ex-Wife’s new attorney entered an appearance and requested a new hearing due to the delay and the parties’ changed financial circumstances. DRC recommended that no further hearings be held, and TC affirmed this recommendation. After hearing Exceptions filed by Ex-Wife, TC rendered a decision stating that either party could have requested written findings at an earlier date, but failed to do so.

SC noted that KRS 454.350 mandates a specific duty that DRC shall submit findings and recommendations necessary for an order within 90 days of the hearing. Here, SC found that DRC delivered his ruling orally, but did not follow through to see that it was reduced to writing, the form in which it had to be in order to send it to TC for final adjudication. Ex-Wife argued that the mandatory language of the statute thus voided the oral ruling, and another hearing should have been held. Ex-Wife would then be able to introduce new equitable issues as to the circumstances of the parties, which could result in a different division of the marital property. However, in Dubick this SC stated that even if there is a violation of KRS 454.350, any resulting late judgment or report is not void because of tardiness. SC found that the main difference between this case and Dubick is the amount of time that lapsed between the decision and the entry of the order and that the four years that passed in this case is a substantially longer period of time. Nonetheless, SC held that if the KY legislature had intended the judgment to be void when rendered more than ninety days after the hearing of the cause, it would be contained in the statute. Ex-Wife suffered no actual damage as she will receive whatever assets under DRC's findings she would have received four years ago, and she knew what those assets and debts would be due to the oral findings given at the original hearing in 2000. SC noted that allowing a new hearing in this case could encourage parties to purposely delay submitting orders, hoping they could force another hearing (and possibly a better result) at a later time.
SC noted that an attorney who is instructed by TC to draft and submit an order, and who fails to do so, may be charged with violating SCR 3 .130-1.3, requiring the attorney’s due diligence. Finally, SC stated that Ex-Wife also had another remedy for the delay that she did not uses—seeking a mandate of TC or else ask that the order of reference be set aside. TC’s order affirmed.
Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Kentucky Bar Association v. Glidewell (KY) Disciplinary Action

Kentucky Bar Association v. Glidewell, ___S.W.3d___(Ky. 2007)

Two bar complaints were filed against Attorney. The first complaint arose because, in the course of a divorce action, Attorney failed to respond to motions, attend hearings, or communicate with her client. She failed to respond to a motion requesting that her client pay arrearages on and then keep his mortgage payments current. She also failed to attend the hearing and the court entered an order granting the motion. When her client failed to abide by the order her client’s wife filed a motion for contempt. Attorney did not respond to this motion, inform her client about the motion, or attend the hearing. As he had no knowledge of the hearing, her client also failed to attend the hearing. The court found him in contempt and issued an arrest warrant. Subsequently, the client hired new counsel and attempted to have the unused portion of his retainer refunded. However, counsel did not return his phone calls. Attorney responded to the bar complaint but did not file an Answer to the Charge when it was issued. The Board of Governors by a unanimous vote found her guilty of lack of diligence, failure to keep client informed, failure to adequately explain matter to client, improper termination, and failure to respond to an inquiry from a disciplinary authority. Attorney was suspended from the practice of law for a period of forty-five days and was ordered to pay restitution and cost.
The second complaint against the Attorney also arose out of a divorce action. At the conclusion of this divorce action the client still owed Attorney money. Therefore, she filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien on her client’s marital residence. However, she failed to do a title search and discover that title to the home had been conveyed to her client’s parents. She had never represented his parents and they owed her no money. Client’s parents informed Attorney that they now owned the home and Attorney filed a lien release. However, she did not properly identify the property and the lien was not removed. Attorney was informed of the mistake but took no action until after the bar complaint was filed. Attorney responded to the bar complaint but did not file an Answer to the Charge when it was issued. On this Charge the Commission found her not guilty, by unanimous vote, of using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, and committing a criminal act.
Digested by Linda Dixon Bullock, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Bissell v. Baumgardner, DVO and Emergency Custody Jurisdiction; Recusal

Bissell v. Baumgardner, ___S.W. 3d ___ (Ky. App. 2007), decided September 21, 2007

Husband appealed a DVO, which awarded temporary custody of the parties’ child to Wife. Husband argued the court did not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order. Husband also argued the judge should have recused himself. CA held that the court did have jurisdiction and the judge's failure to recuse himself was not error.
The parties lived in KY but moved to UT. Eventually, they filed for divorce and Wife moved back to KY. While returning the parties’ child to Wife, after weekend visitation, Husband threatened to shoot Wife. Wife filed a domestic violence petition and an EPO was granted. Wife’s stepfather, a former judge, attended the DVO hearing with Wife. Husband requested the judge recuse himself because Wife’s stepfather had contributed to the judge’s campaign. The judge refused to recuse himself and entered a DVO awarding Wife temporary custody of the child. The judge orally stated that the temporary custody order was subject to modification by the UT court. The judge, however, did not include this finding in his written order.
CA held that the TC had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order. CA opined that TC had subject matter jurisdiction because KY courts have jurisdiction to enter EPOs and DVOs to anyone who is a resident of KY or has fled to KY to escape domestic violence. CA reasoned that Wife had re-established her KY residency, therefore, the TC had subject matter jurisdiction. CA also opined that the TC had personal jurisdiction because Husband made the threat on Wife’s life in KY. The CA, however, remanded the case and instructed the TC to alter its’ written order to reflect that the temporary custody award was made based on TC’s temporary emergency jurisdiction. Also, the written order should acknowledge that any other custody issues should be addressed by the UT court. Finally, CA held that the TC judge’s refusal to recuse himself was not error. There was no indication from the record that the judge was biased and a judge is not required to recuse himself just because a party or their counsel has made contributions to the judge’s campaign.
Digested by Linda Dixon Bullock, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates.

Deposition Misbehavior

While we are posting about depositions, check out Deposition Misbehavior from The Law Profs Blog. It could get you suspended.

Family Law "Super Lawyers" Announced in Kentucky

For the first time, Super Lawyers has published a Kentucky directory, listing who it believes are the top five percent of the state's 14,000 attorneys based on peer recognition and professional achievement. Not surprisingly, ten of the twelve family lawyers selected are Fellows of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers: Mitchell A. Charney, Sandra M. Dawahare, Douglas S. Haynes, William L. Hoge, III, Steven J. Kriegshaber, Martha A. Rosenberg, Louis I. Waterman, Natalie S. Wilson, Catesby Woodford, and yours truly. In fact, of the Louisville family lawyers listed, all are AAML members. Moreover, the top 25 women lawyers in the state, from all disciplines, were listed and three of our AAML family lawyers were included, Natalie S. Wilson, Lexington, Martha A. Rosenberg, Lexington and me. They claim impeccable surveying and independent research. There are many, many great lawyers not listed, but I didn't notice any slackers among those picked.

Yet, I can't see what void this publication fills; Martindale Hubbell has offered peer reviews for decades. "Super Lawyers" does offer some ego feeding for a price: $259 plaques to hang and $495 profiles for the website that get you listed at the top. That may be a bargain compared to a paid listing on Martindale-Hubbell. Kentucky's picks are not yet up on the website www.SuperLawyers.com.

Some big firms already have updated their own websites with the news and have sent out press releases. Lawyers in Kentucky are not generally permitted to compare themselves to other lawyers. Past posts about the related ethical issues have appeared on this site here and here. Kentucky Law Review has posts here and here. The Indiana Law Blog has posted about it here and links to a number of its pasts posts on the topic here.

I guess I better submit this post to the KBA Advertising Commission with a check for 50 bucks and see what happens. If it is not approved, I'll take the post down. It's not a bone I want to pick. But, I'll let you know.

UPDATE: Here's the resonse I recieved from the KBA Advertising Commission.

The AAC has reviewed advertisement # 04602, your Superlawyers Blog submission. The Commission does not consider this an advertisement for legal services, pursuant to SCR 3.130(7.02) and has asked that I refund your $50.00 filing fee.
I have requested the Kentucky Bar Association accounting department prepare a check and for $50.00 and send it to you. It should be forthcoming.

Yeah!

Baker v. Coombs, ___S.W.3d___ (Ky. App. 2007)

Baker v. Coombs, ___S.W.3d___ (Ky. App. 2007)

Issue and Holding:
Whether an attorney owed any duty to an opposing party in a divorce case. The Court held no, the attorney owed no duty under the facts of this case.
Facts:

Baker filed for divorce from her husband, Collins, in 1989. A divorce decree, which referenced their Property Settlement Agreement, was entered in 1990. As part of the Agreement, Collins agreed to pay Baker $500,000. A balloon payment of $300,000 was due by January 1, 2002 and the remaining $200,000 due in ten annual installments of $20,000 continuing through January 1, 2001. The Agreement also provided that if the balloon payment was paid prior to the due date, the other payments would be forgiven. As security for the payments, Baker was given liens on all of Collin’s stock holdings of closely held corporations. Collin was to “execute all necessary documents to effectuate these liens” and “the Certificates shall be held by Ronald Coombs, Attorney.” Coombs represented Collins in the divorce proceedings and in other matters.
Despite the Agreement, Collins never gave Coombs any stock certificates before Collins died in September 1999. Coombs asked Collins for the certificates, but Collins never delivered them. Shortly before Collin’s death, Baker discovered that he had sold his interest in his largest corporation in 1992 without perfecting a lien in his stock holdings and making the agreed upon transfer to Baker. Baker did not know what happened to the other corporations, but none of them were listed as assets of his estate. Baker did not know whether any liens were ever prepared and she could not recall inquiring as to the liens or certificates prior to Collin’s death.
In November 1999, Baker filed a proof of claim against Collin’s estate for monies owed to her under the Agreement. The estate objected. Therefore in December 1999, she filed a complaint against the estate, Collin’s widow, and Coombs. Baker alleged that properties were transferred out of Collin’s name, prior to his death, in a deliberate attempt to prevent the payment of monies he owed to her and to reduce the inheritance of his child. She also alleged that Coombs failed to follow the terms of the Agreement in not holding the stock certificates and allowing Collin’s to sell his businesses without taking action to assure that Baker be paid what she was owed.
Baker was awarded a judgment against the estate. Baker and Coombs then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Coombs did not commit professional negligence and that he was not personally liable for the monies Collins owed Baker. The court held that Coombs signed the Agreement only in his capacity as Collin’s counsel, and not as a party to the Agreement. Therefore, only Collins and his estate could be held liable. Baker appealed.

Analysis:

On appeal Baker argued: 1) Coombs placed himself in the position of becoming a fiduciary to her by agreeing to hold the stock certificates, and 2) she should be deemed a third party beneficiary of Coomb’s legal services because he agreed to hold the stock certificates as security for the payments owed to her. Baker argued that, under both theories, Coombs had an affirmative obligation to obtain the stock certificates from Collins, to compel Collins to provide them, or to advise Baker that he had not obtained them.
Regarding Baker’s argument that Coombs owed her a fiduciary duty as a result of being mentioned in the Agreement, the Court first noted that no such duty arose solely from the fact that Coombs signed the Agreement. CR 11 requires that attorneys sign pleadings. Next, the Court noted that in the Agreement Coombs, in effect, designated himself as a de facto escrow agent on behalf of Baker as to the certificates, despite his representation of Collins. Coombs created the appearance that a fiduciary duty might have arisen. However, after examining the literal language of the Agreement, the Court found that Coombs was obligated to hold and secure the certificates only after they were placed in his possession. Coombs had no affirmative duty to obtain the certificates or notify anyone that he was not in possession of them. Since Coombs never took possession of the certificates, his arguable duty to Baker never arose. It remained inchoate and unenforceable. If he had received the certificates, he would have been obligated to Baker for having voluntarily agreed to assume the fiduciary duties attached to holding the certificates.
Regarding Baker’s second argument, the Court noted that a legal malpractice claim may arise only to the attorney’s client. However, an attorney may still be liable to a third party because of events arising out of his representation of a client if the attorney’s acts are fraudulent or tortuous and result in injury to that third person. Liability may be found where the attorney is responsible for damage caused by his negligence to someone intended to be benefited by his actions regardless of any lack of privity. The Court found that absent willful and wanton conduct, fraud, or malice, Coombs owed no duty of care to Baker as a third party beneficiary since Coombs had a contractual obligation to represent Collins against Baker as the adverse party in the divorce proceedings.
The Court observed that Coombs became involved in a situation which had the potential to create a conflict of interest between him and his client. The Court warned that attorneys should review SCR 3.130, Rule 1.7 before taking similar steps and obtain prior clear consent from the parties if they choose to embark on an analogous course to preclude similar litigation.
Affirmed.
Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates.

Baker v. Coombs, -- S.W.3d – (Ky. App. 2007)

Baker v. Coombs, -- S.W.3d – (Ky. App. 2007)

Issue and Holding:
Whether an attorney owed any duty to an opposing party in a divorce case. The Court held no, the attorney owed no duty under the facts of this case.

Facts:
Baker filed for divorce from her husband, Collins, in 1989. A divorce decree, which referenced their Property Settlement Agreement, was entered in 1990. As part of the Agreement, Collins agreed to pay Baker $500,000. A balloon payment of $300,000 was due by January 1, 2002 and the remaining $200,000 due in ten annual installments of $20,000 continuing through January 1, 2001. The Agreement also provided that if the balloon payment was paid prior to the due date, the other payments would be forgiven. As security for the payments, Baker was given liens on all of Collin’s stock holdings of closely held corporations. Collins was to “execute all necessary documents to effectuate these liens” and “the Certificates shall be held by Ronald Coombs, Attorney.” Coombs represented Collins in the divorce proceedings and in other matters.
Despite the Agreement, Collins never gave Coombs any stock certificates before Collins died in September 1999. Coombs asked Collins for the certificates, but Collins never delivered them. Shortly before Collin’s death, Baker discovered that he had sold his interest in his largest corporation in 1992 without perfecting a lien in his stock holdings and making the agreed upon transfer to Baker. Baker did not know what happened to the other corporations, but none of them were listed as assets of his estate. Baker did not know whether any liens were ever prepared and she could not recall inquiring as to the liens or certificates prior to Collin’s death.
In November 1999, Baker filed a proof of claim against Collin’s estate for monies owed to her under the Agreement. The estate objected. Therefore in December 1999, she filed a complaint against the estate, Collin’s widow, and Coombs. Baker alleged that properties were transferred out of Collin’s name, prior to his death, in a deliberate attempt to prevent the payment of monies he owed to her and to reduce the inheritance of his child. She also alleged that Coombs failed to follow the terms of the Agreement in not holding the stock certificates and allowing Collin’s to sell his businesses without taking action to assure that Baker be paid what she was owed.
Baker was awarded a judgment against the estate. Baker and Coombs then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that Coombs did not commit professional negligence and that he was not personally liable for the monies Collins owed Baker. The court held that Coombs signed the Agreement only in his capacity as Collin’s counsel, and not as a party to the Agreement. Therefore, only Collins and his estate could be held liable. Baker appealed.

Analysis:

On appeal Baker argued: 1) Coombs placed himself in the position of becoming a fiduciary to her by agreeing to hold the stock certificates, and 2) she should be deemed a third party beneficiary of Coomb’s legal services because he agreed to hold the stock certificates as security for the payments owed to her. Baker argued that, under both theories, Coombs had an affirmative obligation to obtain the stock certificates from Collins, to compel Collins to provide them, or to advise Baker that he had not obtained them.
Regarding Baker’s argument that Coombs owed her a fiduciary duty as a result of being mentioned in the Agreement, the Court first noted that no such duty arose solely from the fact that Coombs signed the Agreement. CR 11 requires that attorneys sign pleadings. Next, the Court noted that in the Agreement Coombs, in effect, designated himself as a de facto escrow agent on behalf of Baker as to the certificates, despite his representation of Collins. Coombs created the appearance that a fiduciary duty might have arisen. However, after examining the literal language of the Agreement, the Court found that Coombs was obligated to hold and secure the certificates only after they were placed in his possession. Coombs had no affirmative duty to obtain the certificates or notify anyone that he was not in possession of them. Since Coombs never took possession of the certificates, his arguable duty to Baker never arose. It remained inchoate and unenforceable. If he had received the certificates, he would have been obligated to Baker for having voluntarily agreed to assume the fiduciary duties attached to holding the certificates.
Regarding Baker’s second argument, the Court noted that a legal malpractice claim may arise only to the attorney’s client. However, an attorney may still be liable to a third party because of events arising out of his representation of a client if the attorney’s acts are fraudulent or tortuous and result in injury to that third person. Liability may be found where the attorney is responsible for damage caused by his negligence to someone intended to be benefited by his actions regardless of any lack of privity. The Court found that absent willful and wanton conduct, fraud, or malice, Coombs owed no duty of care to Baker as a third party beneficiary since Coombs had a contractual obligation to represent Collins against Baker as the adverse party in the divorce proceedings.
The Court observed that Coombs became involved in a situation which had the potential to create a conflict of interest between him and his client. The Court warned that attorneys should review SCR 3.130, Rule 1.7 before taking similar steps and obtain prior clear consent from the parties if they choose to embark on an analogous course to preclude similar litigation.
Affirmed.

Digest by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates, www.LouisvilleDivorce.com

Ben Cowgill Booked for Kentucky AAML/LBA April seminar

Benjamin Cowgill, Lexington, Kentucky, is the former Chief Bar Counsel for the Kentucky Bar Association, where he was responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all disciplinary cases against members of the bar. He has also taught professional responsibility as an adjunct professor at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law. Since his return to private practice in 2003, he has counseled and represented lawyers in a wide variety of ethical matters and has served as an expert witness and given opinion testimony regarding conflicts of interest, alleged unethical conduct, the unauthorized practice of law, and legal negligence. We are delighted he will speak at the LBA/AAML seminar on April 19 on Top Ten Ethical Risks for Domestic Relations Practitioners.
Those familiar with the blawgosphere know Ben Cowgill's Legal Ethics Newsletter. His latest post, KBA moves Client Assistance Program into Office of Bar Counsel, is of interest to all Kentucky practitioners, but especially to domestic relations attorneys, because they are especially vulnerable to bar complaints. However, much of his site is highly relevant to those interested in legal ethics all over the U.S., in all practice areas. Ben also publishes SoloBlawg, about technology-leveraged solo practice.

Super Lawyers Coming To Kentucky

Marcia Oddi has the latest story about Super Lawyers at Indiana Law Blog, linking to numerous past articles she has published on the topic, Super Lawyers/Best Lawyers Buoyed by N.Y. Advertising Rule. This blog has a prior post here, too.

Guess what's next? Super Lawyers is entering the Kentucky market and it will be interesting to see whether our advertising commission changes its interpretation that such boasts are prohibited comparisons to other lawyers. We can't even tout a Martindale-Hubbell rating without submitting the objective proof that forms the basis of the rating. If anyone knows how to obtain that, holler!

Ben Cowgill's Legal Ethics Newsletter has a related post and links to the Kentucky Bar Association's frequently answered questions page.

Super Lawyers sued to change the prohibition in New Jersey. Would they come to the rescue of a Kentucky lawyer who advertised inclusion?

Thomas Jefferson Would Have Had a Blog

Ben Cowgill's Legal Ethics Newsletter posted some jewels about internet journalism, Law-related blogs: following in the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson:
If Thomas Jefferson were alive today, there can be little doubt that he would have a law-related blog. He loved to write. He loved to share information and ideas with other people. He once said that he would rather have a country with newspapers and no government than a country with government and no newspapers. He would be thrilled to live at a time when he could share information with interested people throughout the world, simply by sitting down at his desk and writing at a keyboard.
'The legal profession has a great tradition of writing and speaking about the law. Law-related blogs are merely a new example of that great tradition. Until the Internet came along, lawyers had to find other ways to share information about the law: by writing books, articles and op-ed pieces; by making presentations at legal conferences; and by speaking to church groups, civic clubs and the like. All of those activities are valuable because they all spread information about the American legal system to the American people. Now, with the Internet and "blogging software," it's possible for lawyers to continue that tradition in another way, and so it is not surprising that many lawyers are choosing to do so. They are following in the footsteps of other lawyers who have been writing and speaking about the law throughout American history." ...

Online Legal Ethics Resource

Jim Calloway's Law Practice Tips Blog site of the week is the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility's online resource center. Jim says "(T)he ABA Center for Professional Responsibility homepage provides free ethics and professionalism resources for lawyers, such as an online version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, links to many ethics and professionalism resources and various reports and studies. This is the place to retrieve ABA Formal Ethics Opinions. Access to the ethics opinions is free for the first year after their issuance for ABA members. You can also purchase individual opinions for $7.50 each, become a member of the Center for complementary copies of all ethics opinions or take advantage of their ethics opinions subscription service to have them delivered to you as they are issued. Another service that is not always free, but may well be worth the modest fee when you need the help is their ETHICSearch Research Service where staff lawyers do the research for you."

It Is Unethical For Divorce Lawyer to Have Sex With Client

"We generally impose a public reprimand when a sexual relationship develops during an attorney-client relationship if the affair is legal and consensual and has not compromised client interests," the Ohio Supreme Court ruled Wednesday, publicly reprimanding divorce lawyer David Engler. He had sex two times with the client, withdrew, and gave her all her money back. Source: Youngstown Vindicator.
Many states have such prohibitions: California, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Rhode Island and Washington to name a few.
The AAML Bounds of Advocacy prohibits sex with a client during the time of representation and comments, "Persons in need of a matrimonial lawyer are often in a highly vulnerable emotional state...an intimate relationship may endanger both the client's welfare and the lawyer's objectivity."
Same goes for sexual relationships with opposing counsel or a judicial officer in the case during the time of representation. "Attorneys...must be sensitive to the threat to independent judgment and the appearance of impropriety...."
This was the first Ohio Supreme Court decision I was interested in checking out after reading from the Kentucky Law Blog that Ohio had gone to RSS feeds. The update is that apparently not everything is going through the feed. Three disbarment decisions appeared through the feed, but it appears someone may be editing what is posted. Four stars to Ohio for trying RSS fees, the fifth star will come when all published decisions are posted.

Civility Standards

The ABA Section of Family Law has adopted Civility Standards which apply to clients, to the court, and to opposing counsel.
Kentucky has long had a Code of Professional Courtesy, but family law matters have an emotional overlay unlike other litigation, which the ABA addresses in its Standards. Neither is as comprehensive as the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Bounds of Advocacy. If you practice family law, please take a look.

Super Lawyers; Best Divorce Lawyers

The recent New Jersey ethics opinion is gathering steam in the online discussions. The latest announcement of "super" lawyers is from the Family Law News in which it is announced that the San Francisco magazine has recently proclaimed that many collaborative lawyers are among the Super Lawyers of San Francisco.
I loved the Kentucky Law Blog posting about the controversy surrounding such "bests." How much publicizing of such publications can we/should we do?
The Indiana Law Blog has an interesting post on this issue, as well, which details the law in several jurisdictions.
The Kentucky Law Blog posts a long link of online stories:
"NO MORE "SUPER LAWYERS" IN NEW JERSEY . . . It's news that's apparently causing a firestorm in New Jersey [Evan Schaeffer]
Ethics Crusaders Crush 'SuperLawyers', by Henry Gottlieb at Law.com
Law - "Superlawyers" must not flaunt status [Updated] [Indiana Law Blog]
"Lawyer Ads Cannot Tout ‘Super’ Status" is the headline to this story today in the NY Times regional section: * * *
Law - More on: "Superlawyers" must not flaunt status [Ind. Law Blog]
Law.com today posts a story from the New Jersey Law Journal reporting that:
A New Jersey Supreme Court ethics panel knocked "SuperLawyers" and "Best Lawyers in America" out of the business of ranking New Jersey lawyers on July 19 by prohibiting attorneys from advertising their inclusion and taking part in the selection process. * * *
Ethics Elsewhere: New Jersey Prohibits Lawyers' Claims to be "Super Lawyers" and "Best Lawyers" [How Appealing]
NJ Stupidly Outlaws "Super Lawyers" and "Best Lawyers" [Larry Bodine]
“Super Lawyers” and “Best Lawyers” Designations Banned in New Jersey [Larry Bodine]
A Bonehead Ruling [Common Scold Blog]
And of course, here are links to our earlier stories:
Ethics: More on the N.J. Decision Banning Lawyer's Claims to be "Best Lawyers in America"
Ethics Elsewhere: New Jersey Prohibits Lawyers' Claims to be "Super Lawyers" and "Best Lawyers"

We haven't seen the end of this discussion.

An Attorney May Not Represent Both Parties to a Divorce

From The Art of Divorce, representing both parties leads to attorney discipline. Just as I was about to say "duh?", along came an AAML listserve discussion on setting aside an agreement drafted by a mutually retained lawyer. Just say no!

Divorce Lawyer Shopping- Dirty Tricks

We occasiionally see clients consulting divorce lawyers for the purpose of creating a conflict and thus limiting a spouse's choice of attorneys. That's one of the reasons we do not talk with prospective clients until we meet and why we charge our usual fee for an initial consultation. Apparently New Jersey has decided that a lawyer advising a client to create such conflicts of interest is unethical. Makes good sense. Here's Charlie Abut's article from his New Jersey Divorce Blog: