Spousal team Sharon D. Nelson and John Simek of Sensei gave a great presentation at the AAML annual meeting in Chicago last week. I had been following Sharon's blog, Ride The Lightning for a few weeks, so I was surprised and delighted to meet her and learn forensic electronic evidence tips from them. If you check out her blog, please note that the colorful and shameful stories about the wayward lawyer disciplined are NOT about one of our members!
Here are some quotes from a front page New York Times article today, Tell-All PCs and Phones Transforming Divorce.
Divorce lawyers routinely set out to find every bit of private data about their clients’ adversaries, often hiring investigators with sophisticated digital forensic tools to snoop into household computers.
“In just about every case now, to some extent, there is some electronic evidence,” said Gaetano Ferro, president of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, who also runs seminars on gathering electronic evidence. “It has completely changed our field.”
Privacy advocates have grown increasingly worried that digital tools are giving governments and powerful corporations the ability to peek into peoples’ lives as never before. But the real snoops are often much closer to home.
“Google and Yahoo may know everything, but they don’t really care about you,” said Jacalyn F. Barnett, a Manhattan-based divorce lawyer. “No one cares more about the things you do than the person that used to be married to you.”
The article continues,Divorce lawyers say their files are filled with cases like these. Three-quarters of the cases of Nancy Chemtob, a divorce lawyer in Manhattan, now involve some kind of electronic communications. She says she routinely asks judges for court orders to seize and copy the hard drives in the computers of her clients’ spouses, particularly if there is an opportunity to glimpse a couple’s full financial picture, or a parent’s suitability to be the custodian of the children.
Lawyers must navigate a complex legal landscape governing the admissibility of this kind of electronic evidence. Different laws define when it is illegal to get access to information stored on a computer in the home, log into someone else’s e-mail account, or listen in on phone calls.
Divorce lawyers say, however, if the computer in question is shared by the whole family, or couples have revealed their passwords to each other, reading a spouse’s e-mail messages and introducing them as evidence in a divorce case is often allowed.
Lynne Z. Gold-Bikin, a Pennsylvania divorce lawyer, describes one client, a man, who believed his wife was engaging in secret online correspondence. He found e-mail messages to a lover in Australia that she had sent from a private AOL account on the family computer. Her lawyer then challenged the use of this evidence in court. Ms. Gold-Bikin’s client won the dispute and an advantageous settlement.
Lawyers say the only communications that are consistently protected in a spouse’s private e-mail account are the messages to and from the lawyers themselves, which are covered by lawyer-client privilege.
Perhaps for this reason, divorce lawyers as a group are among the most pessimistic when it comes to assessing the overall state of privacy in the digital age.
“I do not like to put things on e-mail,” said David Levy, a Chicago divorce lawyer. “There’s no way it’s private. Nothing is fully protected once you hit the send button.”
Ms. Chemtob added, “People have an expectation of privacy that is completely unrealistic.”
James Mulvaney agrees. A private investigator, Mr. Mulvaney now devotes much of his time to poking through the computer records of divorcing spouses, on behalf of divorce lawyers. One of his specialties is retrieving files, like bank records and e-mail messages to secret lovers, that a spouse has tried to delete.
“Every keystroke on your computer is there, forever and ever,” Mr. Mulvaney said.
He had one bit of advice. “The only thing you can truly erase these things with is a specialty Smith & Wesson product,” he said. “Throw your computer into the air and play skeet with it.”
I was pleased to see Guy Ferro, AAML president quoted in the article as well as Lynne Gold-Bickin who is coming to present at our seminar in Louisville next April and David Levy, who was here this past April and with whom I am co-counseling on a case. I may post more in the coming days about the law in this area. Meanwhile, thanks to Marcia Oddi at Indiana Law Blog for spotting this article and posting about it here while I was out having a grand old time at Idea Festival.As family courts struggle with huge caseloads and as a movement to informalize procedure gains ground, Family Law Prof Blog has this to say about Elkins v. Superior Court (California Supreme Court, August 6, 2007)
The California Supreme Court has invalidated a county court rule that required divorce trials be submitted on written declarations and prohibited oral testimony except in “unusual
circumstances.” The rule also required parties to establish in their pretrial declarations the admissibility of all exhibits they sought to introduce at trial. A divorce litigant whose evidence was excluded because he had failed to establish its admissibility in the pretrial stage challenged both sets of rules.
The court acknowledged that local courts have rulemaking authority, however, "local courts may not create their own rules of evidence and procedure in conflict with statewide statutes." Avoiding the constitutional issues presented by the case, the court analyzed the statewide evidence and procedure statutes, the caselaw concerning hearsay admissibility, and the history of trial procedure in the state, concluding that the local rule conflicted with these statewide evidence rules regarding hearsay.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the local rules were designed in response to increasing case loads and limited judicial resources. However, on balance, that did not justify the violation of basic trial procedures.
That a procedure is efficient and moves cases through the system is admirable, but even more important is for the courts to provide fair and accessible justice. In the absence of a legislative decision to create a system by which a judgment may be rendered in a contested marital dissolution case without a trial conducted pursuant to the usual rules of evidence, we do not view respondent’s curtailment of the rights of family law litigants as justified by the goal of efficiency. ... While the speedy disposition of cases is desirable, speed is not always compatible with justice. Actually, in its use of courtroom time the present judicial process seems to have its priorities confused. Domestic relations litigation, one of the most important and sensitive tasks a judge faces, too often is given the low-man-on-thetotem-pole treatment.”
Regarding the court's sanction of excluding evidence for failure to establish admissibility in pretrial proceedings, the court concluded that "The trial court abused its discretion ... by excluding the bulk of his evidence simply because he failed, prior to trial, to file a declaration establishing the admissibility of his trial evidence.... The sanction was disproportionate and inconsistent with the policy favoring determination of cases on their merits."
S.L.T. v. R.J.C., 196 S.W.3d 530 (Ky.App. 2006)
Issue and Holding:
Whether the trial court erred in issuing a domestic violence order. The Court held no, the trial court did not err because the evidence established that domestic violence had occurred and may occur again.
Facts:
The parties, never married, are the parents of one child. R.J.C, the mother, filed a domestic violence petition against the father, S.L.T., alleging that he sexually abused their child. The court issued several emergency protective orders to restrain the father from having contact with the mother or child. The court then held a hearing on both the domestic violence petition as well as a separate dependency action. At the hearing, the parties agreed to waive the hearing on the dependency action and scheduled further proceedings for a later date. However, it was noted that the initial sexual abuse allegations had been substantiated and that the investigation was still ongoing. Over the father’s objection, the court ordered him to have no contact with the child, who was to remain in the mother’s custody.
When the court proceeded with the hearing on the domestic violence petition, the father objected to any portion of the petition that contained hearsay. The court sustained the objection. The court then heard sworn testimony from the mother and a social worker. The mother testified that after she picked the child up from her father, the child immediately talked to her about the abuse, that the mother called 911 and had the child examined at a hospital, and that the mother had observed the child “hunching” things and talking about similar behavior. The social worker testified that she was present during the child’s interview and that the allegations had been substantiated. The court found that domestic violence had occurred and may occur again, and granted the DVO. The father appealed.
Analysis:
KRS 403.750 provides that a court may issue a DVO if after a hearing it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence has occurred and may occur again. Under KRS 403.720(1) sexual abuse is included in the definition of domestic violence.
The Court found that the trial court did not base its ruling on hearsay, as the father argued. The trial court correctly based its ruling on the testimony of the mother and social worker, which adequately supported the court’s determination that a preponderance of the evidence showed that domestic violence had occurred and may occur again.
The Court affirmed the trial court’s order.
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, et al v. A.G.G. and W.E.G., 190 S.W.3d 338 (Ky. 2006)
Issues and Holdings:
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to terminate parental rights. The Court held yes, the evidence was sufficient.
2. Whether out-of-court statements made by a child to a therapist and pediatrician describing sexual abuse were admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. The Court held yes, that the statements were admissible under the hearsay exception.
3. Whether the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, as outlined in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), applied to termination of parental rights proceedings. The Court held no, the right of confrontation is not applicable in such proceedings because termination of parental rights proceedings are civil and not criminal.
Facts:
A.G.G. and W.E.G., both mentally disabled, are the parents of two children, N.E.G. and A.E.G. The family lived at two residences, their own home and the home of the children’s paternal grandparents. The Cabinet found both residences to be unsafe and in poor condition and the children to have poor hygiene, missed school, and delayed learning. The parents ignored appointments with social workers. The Cabinet also learned that two paternal uncles, who lived primarily at the paternal grandparents’ residence, were possible sexual offenders. There was evidence that at least one of the uncles sexually abused N.E.G. at the paternal grandparents’ residence.
The Cabinet made numerous recommendations, which were adopted by the family court as a disposition order. The recommendations included regular school attendance, improved home sanitation and hygiene, and that the children have no contact with certain paternal relatives. The parents failed to comply and the children were removed to foster care. The foster mother later observed N.E.G. sexually acting out with A.E.G. and other children. After repeated failure of the parents to respond to family services, the Cabinet filed a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights.
The family court terminated the parental rights of both parents after a two day trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the family court admitted improper hearsay evidence in violation of the holding in Crawford v. Washington. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
Analysis:
First, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to terminate parental rights. The Court found that the family court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and were supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Court found that there was ample evidence that N.E.G. was sexually abused and that the parents created a risk that an act of sexual abuse would be committed on A.E.G.
Second, the Court held that the statements made by N.E.G. to his therapist and pediatrician were admissible at trial under KRE 803(4), the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, even though the therapist was not a physician. N.E.G. made statements to the therapist regarding sexual abuse by his two uncles and father. Such statements were admissible, even though the therapist was not a physician, since the therapist testified that she intended to provide any needed therapy for the child’s mental health. N.E.G. made statements to the pediatrician regarding sexual abuse by one of his uncles. Such statements were admissible since the physician was diagnosing and treating the child for suspected abuse.
Finally, the Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Crawford to exclude the above statements. The Court found that Crawford was not intended to apply where the Sixth Amendment does not apply, such as in civil proceedings. Since termination of parental rights proceedings are civil, not criminal, Crawford does not apply. The Court also rejected the Court of Appeals’ reliance on G.E.Y. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 701 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.App. 1985), for the proposition that hearsay exceptions do not apply in termination of parental rights proceedings. The Court noted that it had narrowed the holding of G.E.Y to permit the introduction of portions of the Cabinet’s investigative file that would be admissible if the social worker testified in person. Thus, G.E.Y. did not preclude the introduction of the statements of N.E.G. to the therapist and pediatrician.
The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the judgment of the family court.
Gaskill v. Robbins, NO. 2005-CA-002088-MR, http://opinions.kycourts.net/coa/2005-ca-002088.pdf, was decided December 8, 2006 in an Opinion Reversing and Remanding which is designated to be published. The custody determination and business value determined by Warren Family Court Judge Margaret Ryan Huddleston were reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The trial court rejected any valuation which excluded any goodwill stating that “there is no reported legal authority for the distinction in goodwill” (personal v. enterprise). “To the contrary, it is generally accepted in Kentucky that the goodwill of a closely held corporation should be assigned value in a dissolution proceeding,” citing to Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.App. 1991), Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56 (Ky.App. 1990), and Heller v. Heller , 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky.App. 1984), in support of this proposition.”
The Court of Appeals noted “While we acknowledged that ‘the goodwill contained in a business should be considered when arriving at the value of a practice,’ Id. at 55, citing Heller, 672 S.W.2d at 947 (Emphasis added), we rejected the argument that Heller held that all businesses have goodwill. Id. Consequently, we upheld the trial court’s decision to not include an amount for goodwill in valuing the appellee’s medical practice, concluding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, Id. at 56.”… The question therefore arises as to whether the court gave appropriate consideration to the issue and properly exercised the discretion afforded to it in matters of valuation. See Clark, 782 S.W.2d at 60, citing Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.App. 1987). We believe that it did not. As the court was laboring under the misconception that providing a value for goodwill was compulsory in reaching its decision, we believe that it cannot be said that the court exercised its discretion appropriately.”
Here is the meat of the decision on this issue:
“After considering the issue and the facts of this case, we are not inclined to deviate from long-standing precedent by creating a wholesale change of law holding that “personal” and “enterprise” goodwill should be distinguished for purposes of property evaluation in a divorce proceeding – even given that Gaskill’s practice is a sole proprietorship. Issues of stare decisis aside, we believe that “[i]t would be inequitable to hold that the form of the business enterprise can defeat the community’s interest in the professional goodwill. Such a result ignores the contribution made by the nonprofessional spouse to the success of the profession ….” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. 1987).”
The problem in the facts before the Court of Appeals in this case was that the non-professional spouse was actively involved in the business. So, while the contributions of the non-professional spouse may be quite relevant to the facts of this case, they usually are not. I agree with Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley, sitting as Special Judge, who stated in his Concurring Opinion “I believe she makes a compelling case that ‘personal’ goodwill should not be considered marital property to be divided between the parties. I believe, however, that this is a matter to be addressed to our Supreme Court.”
So now what will retired Justice James E. Keller, counsel for appellant on appeal, do next? He won a reversal and new trial for his client on the child custody issue because the trial court relied on hearsay, and he won on the ruling that the court should have considered introduction of a prior inconsistent statement made by a psychologist to another psychologist. I cannot ever recall seeing a party asking an appellate court to bifurcate issues, but it sure would be nice if he could take the Court of Appeals ruling back to the trial court for the new trial on the custody issue, yet file a motion for discretionary review in the Kentucky Supreme Court on the goodwill issue. The timing would be pure gold in that the Kentucky Supreme Court recently accepted discretionary review in another divorce case involving goodwill.
Com., Cab. For Health & Family Services v. Byer,
173 SW3d 247 (Ky.App,. 2005)
Cabinet for Health & Family Services was a party to the action
because it initiated dependency action, but trial court order
directing the Cabinet to pay expert witness fees was reversed
because KRE 760(A) requires a court to enter a show cause order
why expert witnesses should not be appointed when the court
desires to appoint its own expert. This process guarantees the
parties will have notice and an opportunity to be heard.
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