Divorce Law Journal

Temple v. Temple, Child Custody, Ky COA

Temple v. Temple, ____S.W.3d____(Ky. App. 2009)

Karen is the adopted daughter of Cheryl and Phillip.  At the time of the adoption, Karen was classified as severely emotionally disturbed.  When the parties divorced, Karen remained with Cheryl.  In 2003, at seventeen years old, Karen had a child, N.T.  Karen and N.T. lived with Cheryl for the first twenty months of the child’s life and Karen relied heavily on Cheryl for the support and care of N.T.  Karen later moved into an apartment with N.T., but still relied heavily on Cheryl.  Karen was investigated for neglect on two occasions, but the allegations were not substantiated.  However, social workers testified that N.T. thrived better with Cheryl than with Karen.  In 2007 Karen gave Cheryl written permission to seek medical treatment for N.T. when necessary.  She also agreed that N.T. should live with Cheryl.  In November 2007 Phillip took N.T. for a visit and did not return him.  Cheryl petitioned the court to declare her a de facto custodian and grant her permanent custody, or in the alternative grant her joint custody.  Karen filed a written response, but did not seek custody for herself.  Instead, she argued that her father should have custody. 

    After a hearing, the DRC rendered findings and conclusions of law that were adopted by the trial court.  The court found that Cheryl was not a de facto custodian, since she failed to meet the one year time requirement.  However, the court found that Karen waived her superior right to custody and therefore granted Cheryl sole custody of N.T.  Phillip and Karen were granted shared visitation with N.T. one weekend a month.  Karen was ordered to pay Cheryl $60 per month child support.  Karen appealed. 

    COA affirmed, finding that Karen had waived her superior right to custody by failing to seek custody for herself.  Karen admitted that she did not want custody of her son.  She stated that if she were awarded custody she would give N.T. to her father.  Her testimony was equivalent to an express waiver.    

    Digested bySarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Ky Supreme Court Minutes Yesterday

No family law to be published opinions were released, but discretionary review was granted in Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, v. L.J.P., et al. A digest of the court of appeals opinion and link to the decision is here. Briefing will be expedited and oral arguments will be held August 12, 2009 at 11 a.m.

J.G. v. J.C., Ky COA, Defacto Custodian

J.G. v. J. C. , _ S.W.3d _ (Ky. App. 2009), 2008-CA-1023

Parents appeal the judgment holding that the grandparents are the de facto custodians of S.G. The parents have three other children, all of whom had been previously removed. Due to previous issues, social services placed S.G. with the grandparents three days after she was born. A couple of weeks later the parents filed a motion to terminate the temporary custody order and have S.G. returned to their care. The trial court denied the motion. The parents then participated with social services to try to regain custody of S.G. After about eleven months, the grandparents filed a petition for declaration of de facto custodian and permanent custody. After numerous hearings, the DRC recommended that the grandparents be deemed the de facto custodians of the child and be awarded permanent custody. The trial court adopted the DRC recommendations. The parents filed exceptions to the findings, a motion to alter the court’s decision, and a motion for further findings of fact. The trial court denied the motions and this appeal followed.

COA found that the grandparents did not meet the statutory requirements for being declared the child’s de facto custodians. COA reversed and remanded, ordering the trial court to make further findings of fact. First, the trial court must determine whether the grandparents met the one year time requirement pursuant to KRS 403.270, especially in light of the tolling requirement of KRS 403.270(1)(a). The time between when the parents filed their motion to terminate the temporary custody order and when the court ruled on that motion does not count toward the de facto custodian time requirement. Next, the trial court must make the findings requested by the parents in a previous motion. Finally, the COA noted that a married couple is considered a single unit for the purpose of de facto custodianship, and therefore a couple may be deemed de facto custodians as opposed to a single individual.

Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

L.J.P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Ky COA, Grandparent Rights In Termination Action

L.J.P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, _ S.W.3d _ (Ky. App. 2008) 2008 WL 4998635

Paternal grandparents appealed trial court order denying their motion to intervene and request for custody of their grandchild in an involuntary termination of parental rights action. The issue on appeal was whether the grandparents have a right under CR 24.01 to intervene in a termination of parental rights action. COA found that grandparents have a “legally cognizable interest” in their grandchildren under Kentucky law. KRS 625.100 recognizes that the child’s relatives have an elevated status when the court awards custody of the child post-termination. It is difficult to understand how grandparents will assert their interest as potential custodians if intervention is not allowed. In addition, grandparent visitation survives termination proceedings if established prior to termination and in the best interests of the child. Pursuant to Baker v. Webb, grandparents have a right to intervene in adoption proceedings. COA held that “[t]he right of grandparents to intervene in an adoption proceeding, recognized in Baker, would be impaired or impeded if the grandparents were denied the right to intervene in the custody determination subsequent to a termination proceeding because the stability of the child as well as the child-grandparent relationship, factors to be considered in a subsequent adoption proceeding, may likely be adversely affected by the custody order that follows termination but precedes adoption.” Therefore, grandparents have a right to intervene in the custody determination under KRS 625.100. REVERSED AND REMANDED
Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Grant v. Lynn, Ky COA, Grandparent Visitation, Pro Se Litigant

GRANT V. LYNN
2007-CA-002193
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: NICKELL PRESIDING; MOORE, STUMBO CONCUR
COUNTY: CHRISTIAN
DATE RENDERED: 10/17/2008

Dad, pro se, appealed TC orders awarding grandparent visitation to Maternal Grandmother with Dad’s children, based on the best interests of the children. Mother is deceased.

The case had been at TC level on remand from last CA opinion in the case, in which CA vacated and remanded TC’s judgment denying visitation because Maternal Grandmother failed to prove the children would be harmed if they could not visit her under the standard of Scott v. Scott. CA remanded because the “harm” standard of Scott had been replaced with the “best interests of the child” standard of Vibbert v. Vibbert. On remand, TC found that it would be in children’s best interests to see Maternal Grandmother one half day each month and to speak with her on the telephone one half hour each week.

In response to Dad’s first argument that as a fit custodial parent, he should be permitted to raise his children without contact with or interference by his former wife’s family, CA stated that there was no argument as to Dad’s fitness as a parent; TC simply found it would be in the best interests of the children to have contact with the family of their late mother. CA found TC’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and the visitation terms were sufficiently tailored to preserve Dad’s desire to raise his children as he sees fit but to also allow the children to renew contact with their late mother’s family.

Dad next argued that KRS 405.021, which authorizes a court to award visitation to a grandparent when it is in the child’s best interest to do so, is unconstitutional. CA found that Dad “combed dozens of legal opinions and strung together a jumble of sentences that do not warrant striking down a statute that has previously withstood constitutional muster, especially when Dad offer[ed] no explanation as to how KRS 405.021 supposedly violates any of the quoted constitutional provisions. While we are willing to overlook inartful pleading by a pro se litigant, we are not willing to create an argument for him. A shotgun blast of random legal jargon and indiscriminate reference to a hodgepodge of legal authority does not a focused or articulate argument make, and such abusive practice misses any reasonable appellate mark or purpose.”
Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

McCary v. Mitchell, Ky COA, Guardianship Custody Between Non-parents

McCary et al. v. Mitchell, et al. –S.W.3d—(Ky.App. 2008), 2007 CA-000322-DG

The Mitchells, maternal aunt and uncle of B.E.M., petitioned the court to be appointed guardians and conservators of the estate of their niece. B.E.M.’s mother was murdered by the child’s father, and the child was currently living with her paternal aunt and uncle, the McCarys. The district court ordered that the Mitchells be appointed the co-guardians and co-conservators of the estate of the child, and that the Mitchells take physical possession of the child after the completion of the 2005-06 school year. The Circuit Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review.
The Court first found that the KRS 403.270 de facto custodian provision does not apply to guardianship proceedings under KRS 387.032. Therefore, the McCarys did not have a superior right to the child. Both parties were to be given equal consideration. The Court then found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child’s best interest was served by appointing the Mitchells as guardians. There was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding.
Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

BEARDEN V. MAULDIN, CHILD CUSTODY

BEARDEN V. MAULDIN
2007-CA-001888
PUBLISHED: REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
PANEL: BUCKINGHAM PRESIDING; LAMBERT AND MOORE CONCUR
COUNTY: JEFFERSON

Mom appealed from TC’s order denying her motion to set aside TC's judgment awarding permanent custody of Daughter to Paternal Grandparents. Mom further appealed from TC’s order denying her motion for visitation, where TC found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider visitation.

FACTS:
Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for custody and an emergency motion for temporary custody of Daughter four days after birth of Daughter due to the abuse of alcohol by and mutual domestic violence between Mom and Dad. TC entered temporary custody order that day and referred the matter to CFC for investigation. CFC subsequently filed DNA action a few days later, and the following day, a hearing was held in which both Mom and Dad appeared drunk and were taken into custody. TC awarded temporary custody to Paternal Grandparents in the custody action and reaffirmed that decision in the dependency action. Mom and Dad were allowed supervised visitation and were ordered to participate in a course of rehabilitative treatment and testing.

Paternal Grandparents filed an amended petition for custody seeking permanent custody of Daughter, which was served on Mom and Dad. Neither filed a response, and Paternal Grandparents filed a motion asking the court to enter a default judgment granting them permanent custody of Daughter. Neither Mom nor Dad appeared at the hearing or filed anything to object to the entry of the order granting permanent custody of Daughter to Paternal Grandparents. TC entered an order granting Paternal Grandparents permanent custody. Paternal Grandparents then initiated proceedings in Alabama, their home state, to formally adopt Daughter. Those proceedings were still pending when this Opinion was rendered.

Almost one year after the default hearing, Mom filed a motion to set aside the default custody decree entered against her pursuant to CR 60.02(d) and (f). In support of her motion, Mom filed affidavits signed by herself and Dad. Dad's affidavit indicated that he told Mom if she intervened in the custody case, she would suffer further bodily harm, including death. Dad also stated that he had access to the only vehicle and telephone and that he prevented Mom from using either during this period. Further, Dad explained that Paternal Grandparents colluded with him to prevent Mom from protecting herself in any way during the custody case. Mom's affidavit listed the same facts but also admitted that she and Dad were alcoholics but that she was presently clean and sober.

TC denied Mom an evidentiary hearing on the merits of her motion and issued an order finding that Mom failed to allege fraud or other improper conduct by Paternal Grandparents and had not documented collusion occurring between Dad and Paternal Grandparents to prevent her from attending or participating in the custody proceedings. TC further found that there was no basis pursuant to CR 60.02 to set aside the judgment granting permanent custody to Paternal Grandparents.

Mom filed a motion for visitation and a motion to alter, amend or vacate its order denying her relief under CR 60.02. TC denied Mom's motion to alter, amend or vacate, but stated no grounds for the denial, and declined to exercise jurisdiction concerning the visitation issue, finding that Kentucky was no longer the home state of the child. This appeal followed.

Analysis:
Mom argued that TC improperly denied her 60.02 motion without an evidentiary hearing. CA held that a 60.02 movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if she affirmatively alleges facts, which if true, justify vacating the judgment and further alleges special circumstances that justify 60.02 relief. CA found that the contents of the affidavits in support of Mom’s motion are clear examples of Mom's allegations of fraud on the proceedings and collusion on the part of Dad and Paternal Grandparents and thus are allegations of facts, which if true, would justify vacating the judgment under CR 60.02(f) and possibly (d). CA recognized that affidavits can be a useful tool in the service of judicial economy, but on such a critical matter as fraud and collusion involving the custody of a child they are simply insufficient to form the basis of a decision. CA found that TC should have held an evidentiary hearing to allow Mom to present her claims through testimony rather than basing its decision on the affidavits presented by Mom.

Mom also argued that TC improperly found that it lacked jurisdiction to modify her visitation rights. Paternal Grandparents argued that TC properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over the issue of modification of Mom’s visitation rights pursuant to KRS 403.824. CA stated that under KRS 403.824, the state having original jurisdiction over custody maintains exclusive continuing jurisdiction though the child has acquired a new home state if the general requirement of the substantial connection jurisdictional provisions are met, and that since Kentucky’s adoption of the UCCJEA, continuing jurisdiction trumps home state jurisdiction. In the instant case, Kentucky had original jurisdiction over custody. Despite the fact that Daughter had acquired a new home state, Kentucky is still the home state of Daughter’s mother, Mom, who is alleging that Paternal Grandparents obtained custody by fraud and then transported Daughter to their home state, which subsequently asserted jurisdiction. Accordingly, despite the Alabama court’s finding that Kentucky was no longer the home state of Daughter, Mom, a contestant, still resided in Kentucky and Kentucky was the initial state to make the custody determination. CA found that Kentucky therefore has continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to determine visitation.

Vacated and remanded TC’s order denying CR 60.02 motion with instruction that TC conduct an evidentiary hearing, and reversed the portion of TC’s order indicating that it does not have exclusive and continuing jurisdiction and remand for proceedings consistent with Mom’s motion for visitation.
Digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, DIana L. Skaggs + Associates.

KY Grandparent Visitation And Adoption; Zoeller v. Gutterman

ZOELLER V. GUTTERMAN
FAMILY LAW: GRANDPARENT VISITATION AND ADOPTION
2006-CA-002141
PUBLISHED: AFFIRMING
PANEL: THOMPSON, PRESIDING; NICKELL, STUMBO CONCUR
COUNTY: JEFFERSON
DATE RENDERED: 10/26/2007
Grandmother and her Husband appealed from TC’s order holding that Grandfather had standing to seek grandparent visitation and that visitation would be in the best interest of Grandchild.

FACTS:
Grandchild was born to 15 year-old unwed Daughter, and no putative father was named. Daughter agreed that Grandmother and her Husband would be court-appointed guardians for Grandchild. Daughter died about two years later. Grandmother and Husband filed a Petition to adopt Grandchild in Jefferson Family Court, Division Three. Two weeks later, unaware of the pending adoption petition, Grandfather filed a petition for grandparent visitation in Jefferson Family Court, Division Four. The adoption petition was granted about a month later, prior to the entry of the grandparent visitation order. Grandfather than amended his petition in the visitation action, but Grandmother responded that he lacked standing to seek grandparent visitation because of the adoption. A GAL was appointed for grandchild. The GAL filed her report and motion requesting that Grandfather be granted immediate visitation. TC ultimately ordered that Grandfather have temporary visitation with Grandchild every weekend. After seeking a writ of prohibition from CA, which was denied, and receiving SC’s memorandum opinion affirming same, TC finally held evidentiary hearing. TC determined that Grandfather did have standing to proceed and that it was in Grandchild’s best interests to continue his relationship with Grandfather, and thus granted Grandfather’s petition and established terms of visitation. Grandmother and Husband filed CR 52 and 59 motions, both of which were denied, filed an appeal of these denials with CA, and subsequently filed a motion for intermediate relief with CA and requested emergency relief, which was denied.

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS:
Grandmother and Husband contended that TC should have dismissed the case because Grandfather did not obtain a circuit court visitation order prior to the entry of the adoption decree, and KRS 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute, requires a visitation order to be issued by the circuit court prior to the termination of parental rights of a grandparent’s son or daughter to protect grandparent visitation rights with the children of that son or daughter. CA agreed that this was the correct interpretation of the statute, but that it was incorrectly applied as the case at bar did not concern termination of parental rights. CA found it to be even more important that the statute and cases interpreting it did not allude to situations where one grandparent used the adoption statute as a means to bypass the grandparents’ visitation statute, as CA found Grandmother to have done.

Because a parent’s rights lapse upon death, there is no contested proceeding to alert a grandparent that visitation rights need to be asserted. However, neither the adoption statute nor the grandparents’ visitation statutes require notice to a grandparent of a pending adoption petition. This could leave open the door to grandparents engaging in a race to the courthouse to conclude an adoption prior to the grandparent’s visitation petition. CA stated that the pending adoption petition in this case was such a significant fact that Grandmother and Husband were required to inform TC of its existence. CA found that Grandmother’s and Husband’s concealment of adoption petition was a “tactical maneuver to circumvent [Grandfather’s] right” to have TC determine whether visitation was in Grandchild’s best interest, and that such manipulation of the timing of the adoption precluded them from successfully challenging Grandfather’s standing.

Following the modified best interest standard for grandparents found in Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky. App. 2004), CA determined that, because there was strong evidence that Grandfather and Grandchild had a rewarding and loving relationship during Daughter’s lifetime and that Grandchild had established ties to Grandfather’s family, it was in Grandchild’s best interests to have visitation with Grandfather as established by TC.

As digested by Michelle Eisenmenger Mapes, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Grandparent Visitation Practice Pointers

Following the digest of Keenan v Dawson, Michigan Court of Appeals Docket No 265725, decided June 5, 2007, Updates In Michigan Family Law gives some great practice pointers in handling grandparent visitation cases.

Amicus Briefs In US Supreme Court Grandparent Visitation Case

Howard Basham at How Appealing has posted amicus briefs for and against writ of certiorari in a grandparent visitation case in the US. Supreme Court, Fausey v. Hiller, No. 06-863.

Kentucky: Grandparent Visitation

This case is not yet final.
Vanwinkle v. Petry, __ S.W.3d __ (Ky. App. 2007), 2007 WL 121965 (Ky. App.)

Trial Court ordered that Grandparents were to approve any change in Mother’s visitation with children, though Mother and Father shared joint custody. Trial Court also, sua sponte, increased maternal grandparents’ visitation with minor grandchildren from one to two weekends per month.

Issue One: May the Court, sua sponte¸ award visitation to grandparents?

More Discussion About Grandparent Visitation

The Family Law Prof Blog reports: "Many thought the U.S. Supreme Court had essentially settled this issue in 2000 when it ruled that Tommie Granville, a mother in Washington state, could limit to once a month her two girls' contact with their paternal grandparents after the girls' father had committed suicide. But the issue is flaring anew. The highest courts of Pennsylvania, Utah and Colorado recently ordered grandparent visits in disputes strikingly similar to the 2000 case." They link to a USA Today.com Yahoo news report of October 5, 2006, Court Fights Hurt Children.
We posted about these cases here. Marcia Oddi at IndianaLawBlog posted about them here.

Two New Post-Troxel Grandparent Cases

Two More State Supreme Courts Uphold Grandparent Visitation Laws - Despite the Supreme Court's Holding that They Can Be Unconstitutional is an online article by Joanna Grossman posted yesterday. In it she digests the recent Utah and Pennsylvania cases upholding grandparent visitation along with links to them, to Troxel and to other post-Troxel cases
"Importantly, though, the Troxel Court did not rule in such a way as to necessitate the invalidation of grandparent visitation laws nationwide.
Granted, some third-party visitation statutes have been struck down under Troxel. Iowa, for example, struck down its law, criticizing the legislature's substitution of "sentimentality for constitutionality," to the detriment of parental decisionmaking.
However, within the last two years, California and Ohio have both upheld their state's laws against similar challenges, and, within the last month, Pennsylvania and Utah have joined them.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled, in Hiller v. Fausey, that a state law permitting grandparent visitation over the objection of the child's sole living parent was constitutional -- even without any showing that denying grandparent visitation would cause harm to the child...."
The Utah Supreme Court ruled similarly in Uzelacv. Thurgood, another case in which a father denied visitation with maternal grandparents after the mother's death."
It's a useful article to save in your brief bank.
UPDATE: Indiana Law Blog has a number of posts on this issue as well.

Ky S. Ct June 15, 2006 Footnotes

Much ado has been made over the Kentucky Supreme Court footnote 16 in Lisa Baker v. Ernie Fletcher, but on June 15, 2006, (now final) it appears that another gratuitous footnote was made. In B.F. v. T.D., the same-sex custody case based on the defacto custodian statute, at footnote 1, the court says "We also note grandparent visitation is not implicated here. Such cases are governed by KRS405.021."
Of what possible import is insertion of the grandparent visitation statute into a same-sex defacto custodian case? The possible fears of grandparents that the case at issue would affect their rights? If grandparents want rights as defacto custodians rather than mere visitation rights, why wouldn't this case implicate their rights?

ED v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 152 SW3d 261 (Ky.App., 2004)

ED v. Commonwealth of Kentucky and Cabinet for Health and
Family Services, 152 SW3d 261 (Ky.App., 2004)
District Court order permitting grandparent to visit during parents'
visitation time was insufficient to entitle grandmother to visitation
after parental rights of parents were terminated. Statute governing
grandparent visitation requires a visitation order issued by Circuit
Court prior to the termination of parental rights.

Statute granting grandparent visitation requires a visitation order issued by Circuit Court prior to the termination of parental rights of grandparents' son or daughter to protect grandparent visitation rights with the children of that son or daughter. A District Court order establishing the number of hours of visitation that parents could have with their children in state custody and providing that grandparents may visit the children during this time was not sufficient to serve as a basis for maternal grandmother to have visitation with the children upon termination of the parents' parental rights. This order did not give grandparents visitation independent of the parents nor specify visitation rights for the grandmother, and there was no indication that court was aware of the maternal grandmother or her fitness for visitation.