Divorce Law Journal

Goldstein v. Feeley, Ky. S. Ct., Jurisdiction, Writs of Prohibition and Mandamus

Goldstein v. Feeley, __ S.W.3d __ (Ky. 2009)

A limited Decree of Dissolution was entered in 2003, dissolving the marriage of Ruby JoAnn Young-Layer and Robert James Layer and reserving the remaining issues, including the division of marital property, for future determination. In 2006, Robert died.  No property issues had been resolved.  Upon the wife’s motion, Robert’s estate was substituted as the real party in interest in the dissolution matter.  In March 2008, on the wife’s motion, the court entered a restraining order to prevent Appellant from transferring any interest in the estate’s assets without court order or agreement of the wife.  Appellant then filed motions to set aside the restraining order and to dismiss the dissolution action for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The court denied his motions.  The wife then asked the court for a temporary injunction in place of the restraining order.  Before the court could hold hearing on the matter, Appellant petitioned the COA for a writ of mandamus and prohibition. The COA denied the petition on the grounds that Appellant had an available remedy through an interlocutory appeal of the injunction.

SC affirmed.  Such writs are authorized in two circumstances: 1) where a court is acting out of its (subject matter) jurisdiction, and 2) where the lower court has jurisdiction but is proceeding erroneously and there is no adequate remedy by appeal. Because the question of personal jurisdiction is reviewable on appeal, writs are unavailable to litigants claiming lack of personal jurisdiction.  Therefore, the COA correctly denied Appellant’s writ.  Regardless of the question of personal jurisdiction, the trial court retained in rem jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of the marital property and the authority to equitably divide it.      

Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates

Kentucky Supreme Court Schedules Oral Argument for a Second Husband/Bio-dad Case

The Kentucky Supreme Court has stayed a trial in Rhoades v. Ricketts, expedited the briefing schedule in the matter of J.N.R., et al. v. Hon. Joseph O’Reilly, Judge, Jefferson Family Court, 2007-SC-000175-MR, and has scheduled oral arguments September 12, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., at the University of Kentucky College of Law courtroom, 620 Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky. This is the same date that Hinshaw #1 oral arguments are scheduled as we posted here yesterday. The Supreme Court granted the extraordinary stay of proceedings below which might have resulted in a determination of paternity to the bio-dad of a child born into an intact marriage. We reported on Rhoades v. Ricketts here. After the Court of Appeals dissolved the stay it initially imposed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the stay. The issue which brought this to the Supreme Court case is whether irreparable injury would result if a paternity decision was rendered that may later be reversed on direct appeal. Presumably the underlying paternity rights of a bio-dad to an infant born during a marriage will be addressed.

Stopping Vexatious Litigation After Divorce

An attorney spouse brought multiple lawsuits against his ex-wife, her family, as well as several lawyers and judges. Finally, in Davey v. Dolan, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68960 (September 26, 2006), digested by the Family Law Prof Blog, " the US District Court for the Southern District of New York not only dismissed all the claims for failure to state a claim or on the basis of res judicata, but also sanctioned the attorney. Under the court's inherent authority and the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the Court ordered husband to pay the reasonable costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred by the defendants in responding to the action and permanently enjoined him from "(1) pursuing further federal litigation that in any way relates to any matter arising out of his matrimonial dispute without first obtaining the authorization of the District Court, and (2) pursuing further state litigation that in any way relates to any matter arising out of his matrimonial dispute without appending this Court's opinion and order of injunction to his first filings."
That federal statute provides: Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Civil Rule 11 would have supported the same fee shifting result, and in most states is not limited to attorneys. I would love to see the legal analysis of the injunctive relief. If anyone has access to the opinion or briefs, please pass them on and I will do an update.