The Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed three appeals stemming from the same Boone Family Court post-dissolution case:
The first appeal filed by Father challenges the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, custody modification, and child support modification. Father first argues the Kentucky court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Petition was filed in Kentucky before the Montana court determined Kentucky was the more convenient forum. Prior to the current appeal, Father filed a writ of prohibition and the Court of Appeals held Kentucky had subject-matter jurisdiction. As the “law of the case” doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court applies to any subsequent trial or appeal, even if erroneous, Father’s argument is without merit. The Court of Appeals holds the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction.
Father goes on to argue the trial court abused its discretion in modifying custody. He first cites Mother’s failure to file two affidavits pursuant to the requirements set forth in KRS 403.350. The Court of Appeals applies the Supreme Court’s ruling in Masters v. Masters holding, “a trial court had authority to rule on a motion for custody modification despite the party’s noncompliance with an affidavit.” Masters v. Masters, 415 S.W.3d 621, 624 (Ky. 2013).
Father further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the custodial evaluation. The Court of Appeals affirms the trial court holding it did not abuse its discretion citing its consideration of all the evidence and finding the custodial evaluation less credible than other evidence presented.
Father also argues the trial court abused its discretion in modifying child support. The Court of Appeals disagrees holding the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous in that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
The second appeal filed by the children’s GAL questions the trial court’s authority to overrule the GAL’s objection to testimony from the children’s psychotherapist. KRE 507 governs patient-psychotherapist privilege and grants exceptions to the privilege only when the mental condition of the patient is at issue. In this case, the testimony was not directly related to the mental health of the children. Traditionally, no exception would apply. However, Kentucky has never held children have an independent right to assert patient-psychotherapist privilege in custody proceedings.
The Court of Appeals holds that a GAL when appointed may either invoke or waive the patient-psychotherapist privilege on behalf of the child stating:
“To allow a parent to waive a privilege held by the child in a custody
dispute, over the objections of that child, is not only bad policy, but defeats the
purpose of the existence of the privilege. The impropriety of a rule allowing such
waiver would be further complicated here by the fact that the parent waiving the
privilege was furthering interests which are neutral, if not actually adverse, to those
of the children.”
The Court of Appeals reverses the trial court to the extent the testimony from the children’s psychotherapist was admitted.
Notably, the court states this case is distinguishable from Bond v. Bond where the mental health of the children was at issue, but does not clarify when the children’s mental health is of enough significance to rise to the level of one of the exceptions to the privilege found in KRE 507(c). Bond v. Bond, 887 S.W.2d 558 (Ky. App. 1994). The court simply states, “the psychotherapist-patient privilege protects confidential communications from disclosure no matter how relevant they may be to a disputed issue.”
The final appeal addresses issues of contempt. Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for make-up parenting time as a sanction for Mother’s contempt. The Court of Appeals holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Father’s motion did not include any language to indicate his request was sought as a sanction, contained multiple motions, and was moot.
Next Father argues the court abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify child support when one of his children turned eighteen. Father’s motion did not include a child support worksheet, income information, or insurance documentation as required by KRS 403.212(6)(a) and FCRPP 9(4). While Father is entitled to a review of child support, the Court of Appeals holds the trial court correctly determined the motion at issue was defective.
Finally, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by staying Mother’s payment of his attorney fees as a sanction during the appeal. The Court of Appeals holds the prevention of inconsistent rulings is a legitimate reason to stay the enforcement of the sanction and such order was within the trial court’s discretion.
Digested by Elizabeth M. Howell